

### FROM THE EDITOR

Greetings from the USACOM Joint Warfighting Center! We have had a very busy six months. Several joint publications have been approved and a significant number have progressed in development. We expect to surpass an aggregate of 100 approved joint publications in the next six months. This is a significant milestone in the joint publication development business. We are already seeing an increase in the number of publications now going into revision, having marked their first five years in existence. The focus of our staffing efforts now turns toward the improvement of approved joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Part of that focus has been an effort by the Joint Staff J-7 to divest itself of responsibilities as the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor and shift those responsibilities to other Joint Staff directorates. This effort is intended to give propriety of joint publications to those that work with and benefit the most from the doctrine. It also is intended to assist the staffing process by sharing the load. It is hoped that this change and the increased use of the Internet for staffing will keep development milestones in step with the guidelines established in JP 1-01, "Joint Doctrine Publication System," which is under revision.

The USACOM JWFC Home Page address has changed to *www.jwfc.acom.mil*. Due to DOD security guidelines, the Doctrine Division Home Page is accessed through the "limited access" section on the USACOM JWFC Home Page. You will be presented with a security login and password query. If you have not previously registered, you will be directed to an "access denied" notification page that contains a registration form. Just fill out the form and you will be given the tools necessary for access. We apologize for the inconvenience, but the overriding concern is maintaining information security. In our last issue, we established "homeland defense" as this edition's topic. We anticipated articles from several sources, but this relatively new concept is murky and many organizations have yet to establish a position. We are thankful to those that could contribute their thoughts. Nevertheless, we believe homeland defense will grow in importance over the next several months and we will devote a portion of our next issue to exploring this topic. However, the next issue will focus primarily on logistics support to joint operations. Remember, we need your support in contributing articles which discuss both of the above issues and any other topic you feel may affect the joint warfighting capabilities of our armed forces.

Finally, I would like to take a moment to say thank you to all the people who have lent their support during my two years as the editor of <u>A Common Perspective</u>. I will be leaving USACOM JWFC this May and heading back to the fleet. LTC Keith Greene will be my replacement. I ask that you continue your outstanding support of the joint warfighting community through forums such as <u>A Common Perspective</u> and in the development of joint publications.

Al Bougard, CDR, USN Executive Editor

Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner Managing Editors

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### MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USACOM JWFC

By MajGen Martin Berndt, USMC

It has been nearly a year since I assumed command of the USACOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and I have been tremendously impressed with the quality of the products we turn out that enhance the joint forces' warfighting capability. From joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to training, exercises, and simulations, the USACOM JWFC has been working hard to prepare our forces for the many challenges which lie ahead. To illustrate, a major new initiative is currently underway nationwide to deal with the increasing threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both abroad and here at home. To that end, USACOM has been tasked to coordinate the establishment of a JTF Civil Support, which is responsible for planning and executing military assistance to civilian authorities in response to WMD incidents. This responsibility will challenge our thinking about command and control, equipment, interagency coordination, and particularly training.

The new Unified Command Plan is out for staffing and one of the changes addresses a new identity for USACOM. In October 1999, USACOM will change its name to Joint Forces Command to properly signify its role as the principal advocate for joint warfighting. We have been working hard to refine the products we provide the joint community, as well as those functions that must be preformed to generate them. We must find ways to streamline our organization and better utilize the resources at hand. In the last issue, I elaborated on the consolidation of the JWFC with USACOM. Regardless of what changes occur in the future, we will continue to improve the quality in all USACOM supported and sponsored training events, as well as our support to the Chairman's joint doctrine program.

Our training and exercise effort over the last six months has been focused on such events as FUERTES DEFENSAS, AGILE LION, TANDEM THRUST, ELOQUENT NUGGET, JTFEX-99-1/TMDI 98, LUCKY SENTINEL, and ROVING SANDS. Coordination is underway for Exercises COBRA GOLD 99, MATADOR 99, and BRAVE KNIGHT 99, just to name a few. The synergy realized by combining the expertise embedded in



the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulations Center with that of the JWFC is starting to pay off in terms of quality and efficient use of training time and money. We are using all of our resources to support all six categories of joint training. Additionally, we have enthusiastically responded to requests from various combatant commanders for mobile training teams in support of joint task forces preparing for real-world contingency responses.

The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation and the Joint Theater Level Simulation are expanding their joint user base to include allied nations. We are watching it closely since both are used to support planning/rehearsal and joint experimentation. Additionally, the Joint Integrated Database Preparation System and the Joint Exercise Management Package III are on track. Coupled together, all four programs support the entire spectrum of joint training.

Since the USACOM JWFC assumed responsibility last Fall for the printing and distribution of approved joint publications, we have distributed three new joint publications with five more at the printers. Eliminating the backlog of publications awaiting printing is a top priority.

Important changes are in the wind. That notwithstanding, USACOM JWFC remains committed to providing the best possible support to the joint warfighter through top quality training and training support, joint doctrine and TTP, and modeling and simulation support to our many valued customers.



### USACOM JWFC DOC-DIV UPDATES

#### By Col Bob Brodel, USAF, USACOM JWFC, Chief, Doctrine Division

There has been a tremendous amount of achievement in joint publication development over the past six months. Not only were several joint publications approved, but we also saw movement in the development of 16 other publications. Our hats go off to the entire joint publication development community for their efforts to advance joint publications and resolve issues. This is an indication that the joint publication development process works and improvements in electronic staffing and technology are helping us minimize the time delays between draft publication versions. Keep up the good work!

In the last issue, we spent a great deal of time explaining the transition of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) to USACOM control. Having heard little in the way of complaints or questions, it appears the transition went smoothly. Ibelieve we have answered any doubts, in spades, about our commitment to be the guys with the "white hats." However, I stand by to answer any and all concerns you may have regarding our "honest brokers" role.

The joint publication development community achieved approval of several joint publications over the past six months. The approved list includes JPs 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," on 28 September 1998; 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations," on 9 October 1998; 4-05.1, "JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component(RC)Callup," on 11 November 1998; 4-01.6, "JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)," on 12 November 1998; 1-0, "Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations," on 19 November 1998; 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures," on 13 January 1999; 3-07.3, "JTTP for Peace Operations," on 12 February 1999; 3-15, "Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare," on 24 February 1999; and 3-59, "JTTP for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations," in March 1999. JPs 2-02, 3-13, and 4-01.5 are distributed in hard copy. The rest will follow shortly.

We still await the final outcome for JPs 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats," and 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations." They should be approved soon and we will endeavor to distribute them to the warfighters as soon as possible.

The USACOM JWFC recently completed a joint command and control (C2) doctrine study. The development of JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine

for Joint Operations," was suspended by the Joint Doctrine Working Party until a joint working group could review the publication's current utility and discover if there were still voids or information not already covered by other joint publications. As an outcome from the joint working group discussions, Maj Burt Miller from the Doctrine Division and Mr. Bob Hubner from OC, Incorporated conducted a major study culminating in a 158-page report that is available on the World Wide Web at http:// www.jwfc.acom.mil/ltdaccess/protected/doctrine/ research.html. The study concluded that most C2 subject areas derived by the joint working group are covered in joint doctrine and recommended not developing a new publication, but instead revising and strengthening JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." A complete summary of the study is provided on page 36.

We continued our participation in exercises involving joint issues pertinent to joint doctrine and JTTP development. Since the last issue, our action officers (AOs) observed Exercises AGILE LION 99, ASCIET 99, TMDI, and JTFEX. Our involvement with NATO issues and doctrine is growing. It is particularly notable that the USACOM JWFC has been assigned the lead in drafting AJP-3-4, "Military Operations Other Than War." We recently participated in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3-4 working group and in the AJP-3, "Joint Doctrine," conference in Ottawa, Canada. Additionally, we continued our involvement with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Program for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). Several of our AOs participated in PAJE visits to the Army War College, the National Defense University, and the Marine Corps University.

I wish to recognize our new arrival, LTC Keith Greene, USA, who came to us from the Defense Industrial Supply Center (part of the Defense Logistics Agency). Keith's military background includes flying UH-60 helicopters and serving as a maintenance test pilot and logistics officer. He is filling the big shoes of LTC Roy Henderson, who retired in January 1999 after 28 years of faithful military service. We will miss his logistics expertise and energy. LTC Bruce Childress also retired in January 1999. Bruce ran the USACOM doctrine shop. He will stay in touch, since he is employed by one of the local military contractors. Also leaving the USACOM doctrine shop is Mr. Scott Wales. Scott also will stay in touch through his new position with the Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate at HQ TRADOC.

This Spring and Summer, we will be losing three Doctrine Division AOs. CDR Al Bougard will return to the fleet in May 1999 aboard the USS <u>Dwight D.</u> <u>Eisenhower</u>. "Bogie" was the editor of this newsletter and, since November 1998, Chief of the Doctrine Development Branch, among many other duties. Lt Col Kitty Bryan will be departing for a billet in Alaska, which will be very convenient because her husband is already stationed there. Kitty managed our participation in the PAJE program, as well as numerous other joint publication development projects. Last, but not least, Maj Burt Miller was selected for command and will be leaving this July for command of the 74th Air Control Squadron at Langley AFB, VA. Burt hit the deck running when he first arrived here and never stopped. We wish all of them the best in their next assignments.

The schedule is set for the April 1999 Joint Doctrine Working Party and we expect another informative session. There are several interesting initiatives and issues coming down the line and I am sure the USACOM JWFC will be heavily engaged in all of them. Thanks for your continued support and keep the comments and suggestions coming!

#### JP DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

There has been a great deal of work accomplished on the development and revision side of the house. The key advances were:

- JP 1-01, "Joint Doctrine Publication System," was released for preliminary coordination (PC) on 4 January 1999. All comments have been received and we expect the final coordination (FC) version to be posted electronically during April 1999.
- JP 3-09.1, "JTTP for Laser Target Designation Operations," revision of the 1991 version, has completed FC and is awaiting approval. We anticipate signature in April or May 1999.
- JP 3-35, "Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations" (FC), was posted on 3 March 1999. We do not anticipate any contentious issues and expect approval this Summer.
- JP 4-01.4, "JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution" (PC), and JP 4-01.8, "JTTP for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration" (PC), were posted on 12 and 5 February 1999, respectively. Both should be ready for FC this Summer.
- Other recent postings were JPs 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting" (FC), on 29 January 1999; 3-51, "Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare" (PC), on 13 November 1998; and 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations" (PC), on 14 December 1998.

Draft publications recently released include JPs 3-05.1, "JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations" first draft (FD), on 30 January 1999; 3-55.1, "JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)" (second draft), on 18 December 1998; 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)" (FD), on 26 February 1999; and 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support" (FD), on 4 February 1999.

Last but not least, JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" (FD), is expected to be distributed during April 1999. It has been a productive six months and we expect the next six months to be just as successful. Thanks for all the hard work! Questions should be directed to the JWFC POC, CDR Al Bougard, USN, Chief, Joint Publication Development Branch at DSN 680-6427 or e-mail to *bougarda@jwfc.js.mil* 

#### JP ASSESSMENTS BRANCH

In the last update, we discussed the implementation of a new procedure for conducting joint publication assessments. This change was intended to ensure that lead agents have the most current data in the form of an assessment report from which to base their revision efforts. These new procedures are also addressed in the PC version of JP 1-01. You can look for the first in a series of follow-up assessments beginning in April 1999 when we will release the request for feedback (RFF) message soliciting comments on JP 3-10, "Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations." This publication was originally assessed in 1995, therefore a current assessment report is an essential prerequisite of the revision process. Feedback from this second RFF will be added to the publication's database. A final assessment report will then be prepared and forward to the lead agent (the US Army, in this case) through the Joint Staff, J-7.

To date, the USACOM JWFC has completed a total of 52 assessments. They are JPs 0-2, 1, 1-05, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-02, 3-02.2, 3-04, 3-04.1, 3-07, 3-07.2 (2X), 3-09.1, 3-09.2, 3-09.3, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13.1, 3-15, 3-17, 3-50, 3-50.1, 3-50.2, 3-50.3, 3-52, 3-53, 3-55, 3-56.1, 3-57, 3-58, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7, 4-02, 4-02.2, 4-03, 4-04, 4-05, 4-06, 5-0, 5-00.2, 6-0 (2X), and 6-02. We previously reported that JPs 1, 3-07.1, and 3-54 had been voted to not be assessed under the "old system." However, based on a request from the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (J-7), JP 1 has undergone a formal assessment and the final report was completed in November 1998. For similar reasons, a decision was made to assess JP 3-54, and the RFF for that publication was released in early February 1999. There are four joint publications that currently have open RFFs, JPs 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-54, and 4-01. Note: Although there are many other eligible JPs, we remain committed to timing release of RFFs to one per month. Additionally, there are three assessment reports that are currently under development or being staffed for approval, JPs 3-03, 3-08, and 3-61. As a reminder, readers can ascertain the status of assessment reports by accessing the USACOM JWFC Doctrine Division Home Page. Questions regarding assessments should be directed to the JWFC POC, LTC Steve Senkovich, USA, Chief, Joint Publication Assessment Branch at DSN 680-6409 or e-mail tosenkovic@jwfc.js.mil.



### HOMELAND DEFENSE: The American Challenge For The 21st Century

#### By Lt Col Joseph L. Robinson, USAF; LCDR Carl R. Graham, USN; and MAJ Jeffery R. Oeser, USA

Disclaimer: The original version of this paper was written to satisfy requirements of the Armed Forces Staff College "Joint Perspectives" course. The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of AFSC, its Commandant, or Staff.

#### INTRODUCTION

The continental United States faces a future multidimensional threat unseen in its history. Rogue nations and stateless organizations have or are developing a significant capacity to threaten the United States through acts of terror, information warfare, narco-terrorism, and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, civil demands for disaster assistance routinely exceed civilian agencies' resources and stretch an already overburdened military infrastructure. Currently, responsibility for coordinating, planning and countering these diverse asymmetrical threats and natural disasters falls to a number of disparate government agencies. Technological advances, new adversaries with new motives, and the magnitude of response efforts combine to reduce the relevancy and effectiveness of existing organizational relationships. It is imperative that the Department of Defense (DOD) create a new unified command that is specifically designed and staffed to defend the Nation against 21st Century threats. Additionally, this command should unify the efforts of the many agencies charged with responding to threats and emergencies within the continental United States, either natural or man-made.

#### DEFINING THE EMERGING THREAT

Our institutions, infrastructure, and citizenry are at risk on a variety of fronts. Advanced technology provides the means to produce WMD of unprecedented lethality. "Rogue nations and 'clientless' states, terrorist groups, religious cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups, and even individuals appear to have joined in a new arms race."<sup>1</sup> While transnational terrorist threats abound, eco-terror and global climate changes are threatening the very nature of our environment. In the past six years, DOD has intervened in domestic disaster assistance efforts on 16 different occasions when civil agencies' resources were overwhelmed.<sup>2</sup>

Chemical and biological related incidents have grown exponentially in the past five years. The prevailing threat is fast approaching America's doorstep. Consider that in 1995 "Wayne Harris, a former member of the Aryan nations, successfully ordered three vials of freeze-dried bubonic plague bacteria from the American Type Culture Collection, the worlds largest distributor of microorganisms. Harris paid \$240 for the three vials of a pure strain of bubonic plague that he ordered through the mail."<sup>3</sup> Harris' recent arrest in Las Vegas with anthrax vaccine further clouds his intentions. Also in 1995, a man with alleged ties to a survivalist group was charged with attempting to smuggle 130 grams of ricin into the United States to use as a weapon.<sup>4</sup> The Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released deadly sarin nerve gas into a Tokyo subway system at the height of morning rush hour, killing 12 people and hospitalizing more than 5,000. As early as 1987, this group was operating in New York City.<sup>5</sup> US District Court Judge Kevin Duffy, the sentencing judge in the World Trade Center bombing, stated that he was certain the defendants in the case had laced their truck bomb with deadly sodium cyanide in an attempt to generate cyanide gas.<sup>6</sup> This certainly represents a clear indication that the nature and severity of the threat is changing dramatically. The magnitude of the threat to our population is difficult to underestimate. Recent Office of Technological Assessment (OTA) studies indicate that potential civilian causalities stemming from the use of a chemical/biological weapon would be astronomical.7 The threat to the Nation is tangible and it is only a matter of time before it surfaces in earnest. As a nation, we have not been prepared to prevent, counter or respond to these threats; we have just been lucky. Unfortunately, the Federal infrastructure necessary to actively assess, mitigate, and counter this threat does not exist.

The nuclear terrorism threat has also become more germane as the East-West confrontation fades. Questionable security practices in former Soviet Union states have resulted in several seizures of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium from black marketers. It has been estimated that as few as a dozen specialists could clandestinely develop a crude nuclear device in about a year if supplied with fissile material. Even a crude one kiloton bomb would be sufficient to level the World Trade Center and kill 100,000 people.<sup>8</sup> While many argue that this threat has been exaggerated, we underestimate it at great risk if only because of the horrific cost of miscalculation.<sup>9</sup> Consider the impact of a World Trade Center-like bombing where the perpetrators introduce radioactive material into their explosive device for added effect. Of course terrorists do not pose the only future nuclear threat. Many in Congress see an intercontinental ballistic missile threat emerging against the US that needs to be addressed. As many as 30 countries have ballistic missiles and we can expect an intercontinental nuclear threat from rogue nations in the future.<sup>10</sup>

America's counterdrug effort is often euphemistically referred to as the "war on drugs" for good reason. Headlines across the Nation are replete with references to the substantial connection between drugs, violence, and foreign state actors. There are significant indications that nations and groups hostile to the United States are actively involved in exporting drugs to the United States. Thomas O. Enders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has offered in congressional testimony that the US has detailed intelligence linking Cuba to drug trafficking in North America.<sup>11</sup> As further evidence of this phenomenon, law enforcement agencies estimate that there are at least 22,000 Colombians currently marketing and distributing drugs in the United States.<sup>12</sup> The number of police/Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)/ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers killed in drug related seizures and arrests has increased exponentially in recent years.<sup>13</sup> Recent polls suggest that the American people consider the illegal drug issue one of the most pressing social/security issues confronting the Nation. This is a multi-dimensional threat involving a panoply of actors and requires a concerted and multifaceted interagency solution.

As much as 90% of military traffic transits the civilian information net backbone.<sup>14</sup> At least 730 validated attacks were recorded against DOD information systems in 1996 alone.<sup>15</sup> Civilian sector vulnerabilities are similar. While there is an Interagency Information Warfare Working Group to examine the problem and the Services have other task groups working the myriad of issues involved, there remains a need for a focal point to coordinate the many disparate civilian agencies' efforts, the military, and the commercial sector against this very real threat to our information infrastructure.<sup>16</sup>

Natural disasters kill more than one million people and cost \$120 billion worldwide each decade. In the 1990's flooding alone has claimed the lives of over 200 Americans and caused billions of dollars in damage, to say nothing of losses in productivity and infrastructure.<sup>17</sup> Prevailing conditions appear to be getting more severe, which suggests that devastating weather and geological phenomenon will be the rule rather than the exception. Incidents of eco-terror are on the rise, and there is little to indicate that we have comprehensive and viable plans to counter this threat. Consider the repercussions should a terrorist organization or rogue state elect to conduct operations against the United States coincident with a domestic natural disaster. It is precisely this type of threat for which we are at great risk, and for which we have done little to plan and prepare.

Morris Busby, the former US government counterterrorism coordinator, has warned that, for the foreseeable future, rogue states and subnational groups may be inclined to use WMD solely to punish America.<sup>18</sup> Countering these challenges, in an age of austere budgets, will require the synchronous and collective effort of all

government agencies. It is imperative that we act now to create the organizations, staffs, and forces necessary to counter these emerging threats.

# CURRENT ROLES, MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Responsibility for national security and emergency management currently falls to a host of organizations with different agendas. There is no single organization charged with coordinating all activities of these disparate agencies, and no central clearinghouse and staff to collect, collate, and assess intelligence and respond to domestic threats. Put simply, no civil agencies currently have the organizational structure or experience to accomplish this mission. Despite some effort to fuse intelligence information across interagency lines the results have been mixed at best. The Joint Interagency Task Forces established to counter the drug threat represents the most promising example of interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing. Unfortunately, these organizations are the exception rather than the rule. While a host of organizations are charged with domestic security responsibilities, their efforts are far from synchronized and the results they have produced have been less than laudatory.

The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) is responsible for planning the conventional land and maritime defense of the continental United States, but it also has responsibility for developing plans and providing forces to respond to a host of domestic threats and disasters. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) currently assigns USACOM twelve different missions, two more than any other combatant command outside of USPACOM.<sup>19</sup> Domestic support, however, is not a JSCP tasking and therefore, little budgetary and infrastructure support exists.<sup>20</sup> These ancillary missions are codified in DOD Directives. Further, the operating tempo and the training demands of USACOM units are severe. Requiring USACOM to provide chemical and biological incident reaction teams, explosive ordnance disposal support, disaster assistance, counterdrug, and civil disturbance support exacerbates the problem.

Domestic support operations are executed through a Byzantine organizational structure that has been cobbled together over a period of 20 to 30 years. The current national emergency coordination and response process is replete with echelons of bureaucracy and layers of coordinating authorities that are ripe for reduction and reorganization. Creating a single unified command specifically tailored to respond to domestic emergencies, coupled with streamlining the current command and control (C2) architecture, would enhance defense preparedness.

The FBI is the statutory agent responsible for countering domestic terrorism—recent efforts have been primarily reactive. Internecine squabbles with the Central (Continued on next page) Intelligence Agency (CIA) over the subtle distinctions between domestic and foreign intelligence have impeded proactive operations. The investigation of the *Aum Shinrikyo* incident was decidedly protracted because the FBI considered it a CIA problem and the CIA viewed it as a Japanese domestic problem without a US connection.<sup>21</sup> It took months to discover that this volatile organization had been operating in the US since 1987. A joint interagency intelligence staff focused on domestic terrorist threats, regardless of their origin, would eliminate the intelligence "seam" at our shoreline and allow continuity in collection and reporting.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 in response to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident.<sup>22</sup> The agency was mandated to optimize the use of emergency preparedness and response resources at all levels of government by taking advantage of the similarities and response activities for both peacetime and attack emergencies.<sup>23</sup> However, FEMA has earned a reputation as a bumbling bureaucracy unable to quickly and effectively do its job.<sup>24</sup> Contrary to its mandate to "optimize" resources and governmental responses, FEMA has historically relied on DOD to come to its rescue. Critics have suggested that FEMA is currently unprepared "to assemble and direct assets from many agencies comparable to the way it formerly was able to access those assets from a single agency-DOD."<sup>25</sup> Given the military's superb performance in attending to natural disasters, there has been substantial congressional support for transferring FEMA's responsibilities to DOD.<sup>26</sup> While Congress must assume ultimate responsibility for FEMA's elimination or reorganization, DOD can assist by moving to create a unified command that is modular in structure, and specifically tailored to meet a full spectrum of domestic threats and contingencies. Regardless of the management venue selected, it is imperative that the domestic emergency management system be reorganized and streamlined.

The DEA is one of three agencies currently responsible for the Nation's drug interdiction effort.<sup>27</sup> Its mission is to enforce US laws and regulations on controlled substances and to bring the principle members of drug trafficking organizations to US criminal courts or other jurisdictions. The charter of the DEA is to develop an overall Federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning, and evaluation. However, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), created in 1994, claims a mandate to "devise national strategy to effectively carry out anti-drug activities."28 Given the current state of illegal drug trafficking in the United States, it is unclear who is precisely responsible for developing and executing the Nation's counterdrug programs. Program priorities and threat targets remain a contentious issue between the DEA, Customs, and the US Coast Guard. For instance, the DEA focuses its efforts on the hierarchy of the drug cartels, while the Coast Guard and Customs are fixated almost exclusively on smuggling operations. The inherent

problem is a failure to consolidate resources and synchronize the efforts of all three agencies. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress stated that "the Federal drug interdiction efforts are split among three executive agencies, each with different programs, goals and priorities. No one individual has the information or responsibility to evaluate Federal drug efforts and recommend corrective actions."29 The creation of ONDCP added to the bureaucracy and ambient confusion. The GAO report went on to recommend the President strengthen central oversight and further enhance interdiction by improving the quality and timeliness of intelligence data."<sup>30</sup> The formation of Joint Interagency Task Forces has contributed significantly to reducing intelligence shortfalls and bureaucratic inertia, but further reorganization and consolidation are warranted.

The National Guard often is the first line of military response in the event of a domestic emergency. Guard organizations fill a critical role in supporting their respective states by providing trained personnel and unit equipment capable of deploying to protect life and property, and to maintain peace, order, and public safety. The Guard provides this support through a number of Military Support to Civil Authorities programs. They have begun to exercise burden and cost sharing through a program of interstate compact agreements. These agreements are formed between two or more states to expedite interstate utilization of emergency response assets. They provide a forum for resolving fiscal and legal issues involved in crossing state lines, deliberate planning and coordination, and assessing and allocating personnel and equipment shortfalls. The interstate compact program has been successfully put to the test in a number of domestic crises<sup>31</sup> and represents a viable model for creating a future domestic emergency response force.

There is no agency currently responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing national defensive information operations. In 1972, the OTA was established to "report on the scientific and technical impact of government policies and proposed legislative initiatives."<sup>32</sup> In a 1983 publication, the OTA cited DOD as the "dominant source of Federal support of information, technology, research and development."<sup>33</sup> The OTA was closed in 1995 and the Nation's information operations effort has since defaulted to each of the separate Federal organizations. A fairly representative example of this phenomenon is the FBI's Information, Policy, and Public Affairs Division, which only deals with internal information warfare threats. There is no one organization charged with addressing the national defensive information operations requirements.

#### CURRENT STRUCTURE SUMMARY

It is evident that a host of Federal agencies are involved in protecting the United States from a variety of threats. It is also quite evident that there is a systemic absence of coordination and unity of effort between these agencies. The organizations involved in homeland defense are configured and operate as "stovepipe" organizations that cooperate only by accident. There is little to indicate that sharing ideas and strategies is common. Ideas and actions, with very notable and infrequent exceptions, are employed in a veritable vacuum. It is time to explore a standing structure charged with averting when possible, planning for when able, and responding to when necessary, threats and disasters facing our homeland.

# THE REQUISITE HOMELAND DEFENSE MODEL

American efforts to respond to these new challenges will need to overcome conceptual, bureaucratic, intergovernmental, and tactical problems. Old solutions coupled with bureaucratic and jurisdictional barriers will severely hamper America's ability to address threats in the 21st Century. To meet these new challenges a new unified command must be created.

The Unified Command Plan should be restructured to reflect a functional command, United States America Command (USAMCOM). Its mission would center almost exclusively on countering asymmetrical, unconventional, and environmental threats to the continental United States. As part of this restructuring, USACOM would retain responsibilities for developing plans for the conventional land and maritime defense of the continental United States, North American Aerospace Defense Command would retain responsibility for air defense, and USPACOM would retain responsibility for the defense of Alaska and Hawaii. The JSCP taskings for USAMCOM would include:

- Develop plans for conducting military support to civil authorities in the continental United States.
- Develop plans for conducting defensive information operations in the continental United States.
- Develop plans for combating terrorism in the continental United States. These plans should specifically address the organization, collection, synthesis, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence to civilian law enforcement agencies with primary antiterrorism and counterterrorism responsibilities.
- Develop plans for conducting active and passive defense against WMD. Plans should include provisions for training civil authorities on NBC defense, mass causality response, and decontamination.
- Develop plans for augmenting US Customs Service border security operations.
- Develop plans to provide military support to civilian law enforcement agencies to counter drug trafficking into the continental United States.

The most pronounced benefits to this reorganization would come as a result of a unified and synchronized effort in combating the emerging threats. No longer would one command be responsible for providing for the conventional, unconventional, and environmental defense of the Nation. This division of labor would provide the necessary and appropriate tools to counter a threat undeterred by conventional means, organizations, and forces. The consolidation of functions, and elimination of a number of agencies would contribute to an overall reduction in defense related spending. Most significantly, USAMCOM's assumption of a number of missions would obviate the need for FEMA and its budget, manpower slots, and charter could be rerouted to DOD. Additional savings and enhanced unity of effort could be realized by eliminating ONDCP and giving combatant command (command authority) of the US Coast Guard to the USAMCOM commander.

The USAMCOM C2 structure will be characterized by its simplicity, unity of command, and well-defined reporting channels. A single commander, armed with an interagency staff, represents the most effective organizational means of countering 21st Century threats. The C2 diagram at Figure 1 illustrates the proposed USAMCOM organization, and chain-of-command to the President. By contrast, the current organization has FEMA, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and several other federal agencies all reporting to the President.

The USAMCOM subordinate commands need to be specifically tailored to respond to 21st Century threats. This new command will not succeed if it is populated with the current array of armor, artillery, surface warfare, and attack aviation organizations. Instead, these new homeland defense units must be crafted along functional lines. Homeland defense organizations would be dominated by units and capabilities typically resident in only a fraction of most current military organizations. Logistics, engineer, NBC defense, signal, airlift, maritime patrol, and intelligence analysis organizations would form the backbone of USAMCOM. Figure 1 also illustrates a potential organizational structure for USAMCOM.

To achieve the synchronization and synergy necessary to combat 21st Century threats, the USAMCOM staff must be composed of representatives from the Departments of Justice and Transportation, US Customs Service, and Federal Communications Commission. The problems associated with disjointed Federal responses, fiscal constraints, and administrative redundancy have increased the need for an effective interagency staff. The 1997 National Defense Panel Report on Transforming Defense in the 21st Century lobbies for the creation of "an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilians and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures. Such a cadre would be similar in spirit to the 'joint' experience envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act."<sup>34</sup> The staff would be responsible for interagency coordination, assimilation and dissemination of multidiscipline intelligence, and providing the combatant commander with threat resolution strategies. Figure 2 illustrates a proposed USAMCOM staff structure.

The 1997 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress outlines a number of efforts to realign and reorganize National Guard and Reserve Component organizations. This current reorganization effort could form the basis for creating USAMCOM. The report identifies approximately 100,000 positions that are subject to reclassification or realignment given current Total Force requirements.<sup>35</sup> These personnel could be reassigned to USAMCOM for retraining and subsequent homeland defense missions. The Guard and Reserve are ideally suited to "provide forces organized and equipped for training civil agencies and the immediate reinforcement of first response efforts in domestic emergencies."<sup>36</sup> In addition, they could be readily reconfigured to focus on management of the consequences of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and defense of critical infrastructure, to include information infrastructure.<sup>37</sup> Currently DOD is rewriting its policies to remove inhibitors to the use of the National Guard and Reserve.<sup>38</sup> In a logical corollary move, Congress needs to consider rewriting the Posse Comitatus Act to reflect current geopolitical realities and fiscal and manpower constraints.<sup>39</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

It is imperative that we begin now to prepare our nation for the threats and challenges that we will face in the not too distant future. We need to reassess whether we have the appropriate strategy, resources, and organizations to accomplish those missions that are rapidly breaking over the horizon. "Our national security strategy must always be judged by its success in meeting the fundamental purposes set out in the Constitution to: provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."40 Contemporary organizations are ill prepared and ill designed to thwart the challenges presented by a 21st Century threat, and therefore must be amended. The creation of a new unified command organized, led, manned, and trained to counter the emerging threat is essential to the survival of our nation. If we do not adequately prepare ourselves for the threats and challenges of the 21st Century, we stand to fail in our most fundamental duty.





Figure 1. Proposed USAMCOM Organization/Command Relationships



#### Figure 2. Proposed USAMCOM Staff (Interagency)

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<sup>5</sup> Charles Smith, Far Eastern Economic Review 22.

<sup>6</sup> Laurie Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb," <u>National</u> <u>Interest</u>: 10.

<sup>7</sup> Malcom Dando, <u>Biological Warfare in the 21st Century</u> 9.

<sup>8</sup> David Hughes, Aviation Week and Space Technology: 63.

9 William M. Arkin, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist: 37.

<sup>10</sup> Paul Kaminski and James Canan, <u>Sea Power</u> 37.

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- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., 141.
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- <sup>19</sup> Department of Defense, <u>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</u> xx.
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- <sup>21</sup> Sopko, 16.
- <sup>22</sup> Richard T. Sylves, Public Administration Review: 303.
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<sup>24</sup> David McLouglin, Public Administration Review: 168.

<sup>25</sup> James A. Blackwell, <u>Parameters</u>: 80.

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<sup>27</sup> The other agencies involved in counter drug operations are the US Coast Guard and the US Customs Service.

<sup>28</sup> Office of Federal Register National Archives, <u>US Government</u> Manual 97/98 102.

<sup>29</sup> General Accounting Office, <u>Report to Congress 83-52</u> 96.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>31</sup> National Guard Bureau, "Military Support to Civil Authorities Briefing," 1-25.

<sup>32</sup>Office of the Federal Register National Archives, <u>US Government</u> <u>Manual 97/98</u> 637.

<sup>33</sup> Office of Technology Assessment, <u>Information Technology</u> <u>Critical Trends</u> 31.

<sup>34</sup> National Defense Panel Report, <u>Transforming Defense</u> 66.

<sup>35</sup> Secretary of Defense, <u>Annual Report to the President and</u> <u>Congress</u> 227.

<sup>36</sup> National Defense Panel Report, <u>Transforming Defense</u> 55. <sup>37</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>38</sup> Secretary of Defense, <u>Annual Report to the President and</u> <u>Congress</u> 224.

<sup>39</sup> United States Code, Title 18, "Posse Comitatus Act" (1835).

<sup>40</sup> Office of the President, <u>National Security Strategy</u> xx.

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### SAVING CITIZEN RYAN: US Military Support To Homeland Defense

# By Mr. Richard J. Rinaldo, Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate, HQ TRADOC

#### THE NEW BATTLE

Soon a new battle may be fought in some US city, a struggle of epic proportions beyond the capacity of policeman, fire fighters, medical professionals, and other emergency "first responders." Casualties could approach hundreds of thousands or more.<sup>1</sup> Despite their numbers, equipment, professionalism, and dedication, the resources of local and state governments will be immediately overwhelmed. Their leaders will seek help from the Federal Government.<sup>2</sup>

The source of this new battle and the focus of the National Command Authorities' (NCA) attention is the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our citizens and electronic attack against our critical assets.<sup>3</sup> Critical assets are defined as "those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services, both governmental and private."<sup>4</sup> The WMD threat is unclear. Some believe that a cataclysmic event is a matter of when, not if.<sup>5</sup> Secretary of Defense Cohen, on the other hand, has stated that "nothing is inevitable until it happens."<sup>6</sup>

Many differ on the capabilities of individuals or groups to marshal the necessary resources and expertise to perpetrate a major catastrophe.<sup>7</sup> Dr. Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard biologist, states that "while cheap and relatively easy to produce, biological weapons have immense practical drawbacks: they are difficult to deploy effectively, susceptible to the whims of the wind, totally undiscriminating, and potentially dangerous to the power of the person using them."8 Although real attacks are currently considered "low probability,"9 these threats are being taken seriously by the US government. In 1997 the FBI "opened 68 new investigations into the threatened or actual use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, and 86 similar investigations as of September 1998."<sup>10</sup> Since the *Report of the National Defense* Panel,<sup>11</sup> activities against the threat of such attacks have been lumped under the undefined term "homeland defense."

### STRATEGY, POLICY, AND DOCTRINE

To focus efforts, the new *National Security Strategy* (NSS) specifically states that "Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructure at home is an intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy."<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the NSS elements appear to change from shape, respond, and prepare in the 1997 version to defend, shape, respond, and prepare in the current strategy. Among other measures the new NSS notes that the President will propose the creation of a stockpile of vaccines, antibiotics, and antidotes against the possibility of biological or chemical attack. Various DOD documents also recognize homeland defense as a viable role for military forces and two recent Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) specifically task the Department of Defense (DOD) with numerous lead and supporting responsibilities.<sup>13</sup>

Still, a definition of "homeland defense" is needed. The following proposed definition is based on US Army efforts to prepare for 21st century force structure requirements.<sup>14</sup>

**homeland defense**—The military role in the principal task of the US government to protect its territory and citizens. It includes deterring and defending against strategic attack; supporting domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management regarding WMD; protecting national security assets such as installations and deploying forces; and helping to assure the availability, integrity, and adequacy of other critical assets.

There is a lot of **joint and other doctrine** related to each element of the definition. Two examples are JP 3-01.1, "Aerospace Defense of North America," which addresses defense against strategic attack and JP 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations," which provides guidance on assuring the availability, integrity, and adequacy of other critical assets (i.e., information and information systems). Given the doctrine, we can at least begin to clarify command and control responsibilities. For example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command is responsible for the aerospace defense (air sovereignty, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and air defense) of North America and the Defense Information Systems Agency, in coordination with either government and nongovernment agencies, assists the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in providing indications and warning of computer network attacks. All the elements of the homeland defense will involve extensive coordination and liaison between interagency, joint, multi-jurisdictional (state and local), and active component and reserve component (AC/RC) entities.

Some clear distinctions are important in terms of Federal and state control and the **differing roles of the** 

key agencies involved in crisis and consequence management. Crisis management; measures to resolve a hostile situation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution is a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responsibility under Federal law. Consequence management; those services and activities essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship or suffering resulting from disasters or catastrophes, either manmade or natural; is primarily a state and local responsibility. When state authorities request Federal help, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is usually the lead agent and DOD is in a supporting role. These distinctions are embedded in Federal law; the Federal Response Plan; various DOD directives and manuals; JP 3-07.7, "JTTP for Domestic Support Operations" (preliminary coordination); and Army doctrine in FM 100-19, "Domestic Support Operations." JP 3-07.7 will provide the bulk of needed immediate guidance and after some updating can embrace recent developments, such as Unified Command Plan changes regarding Joint Task Force (JTF) Civil Support.

An Army handbook states that, "Understanding the system for disaster response is key to understanding the special modifications to that system for WMD."<sup>15</sup> However, these special modifications do not require a major makeover to the system. What may be needed is better education and awareness, more inclusive exercises, closer coordination and cooperation among agencies and jurisdictions involved, and a more robust response capability in terms of organization, equipment, technology, readiness, and training. A joint concept, publication, or handbook is also needed as an educational tool and reference for members of joint and Service staffs, local and state response officials, and others involved in dealing with these threats. To guide coordination with the myriad of Federal agencies involved, JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," may require revision to address homeland defense more comprehensively.

Mr. Ron Mayer of USACOM Joint Warfighting Center has raised the issue of the scope of full-dimensional protection. As Mr. Mayer put it, "the term 'battlespace' is a key term in this discussion. He explains that the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) defines it as the air, land, sea, and space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain and the electromagnetic spectrum within the area of influence and area of interest." Noting that the intent and focus of the CFJO is at the operational level, Mr. Mayer points out a blurring of the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. For example, the use of a WMD in a joint force commander's (JFC) battlespace is an event that almost certainly would have strategic implications.<sup>16</sup> Further, it seems reasonable that US sea or aerial ports used for force projection will be a force protection priority at both the operational and strategic levels. Their vulnerability to WMD also has been the subject of a separate study, the Foss-Downing Report.<sup>17</sup> To address this vulnerability, The Air Land Sea Application Agency has begun to expeditiously convert the Army's FM 3-4-1, "NBC Defense of Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields," into a multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures publication.

# TRAINING, RESOURCES, AND ORGANIZATION

The welter of entities and acronyms in the federal government to confront WMD threats has led to some criticism from local and state officials.<sup>18</sup> The plethora of Federal training and equipment in support of local responders has created a similar reaction, according to the Government Accounting Office.<sup>19</sup> To address these issues, an interagency agreement establishes the **Department of Justice as ''one-stop shopping'' for equipment and training resources**. It is organizing a National Domestic Preparedness Office, manned by officials from a variety of agencies, to orchestrate this effort.<sup>20</sup>

Awareness, readiness, and training have also been improved through a variety of domestic preparedness efforts. These range from an Internet Home Page, to a readily available compilation of DOD and other agency assets (also on the Internet), to a full blown City Training Program, currently being executed by the Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command in cooperation with other agencies. The Army's medical community has also been especially active in these areas. For example, the Office of the Surgeon General, DA, sponsors an annual NBC Readiness Conference and has sponsored exercises like AZURE HAZE 97, a consequence management exercise for chemical agents, held in Kaiserslautern, Germany.

DOD will operationally support consequence management against WMD in the near future with the integration of RC units, such as the newly formed National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection elements. They will serve as an advance party to facilitate follow-on deployment of DOD assets in support of "first responders." The teams are being fielded, funded, and trained as a defense reform initiative in accordance with a DOD plan.<sup>21</sup> Though the plan addresses more than the Army's RCs, it underscores Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Dennis Reimer's statement that, "the Army National Guard will always spearhead the homeland defense mission and military support to civilian authorities."<sup>22</sup> The Army National Guard and RCs of other Services are poised for this mission because of their state roles and dispersal throughout the Nation. Plans also include other RC capabilities, especially reconnaissance and decontamination assets. Together, the RC of our national defense comprise nearly a million troops and occupy some 4000 locations throughout the Nation. According to John Roos, editor-inchief of Armed Force Journal International, the mission could be accomplished using about one-third of the Army National Guard alone, about 100,000 soldiers.<sup>23</sup>

(*Continued on next page*)

**Organizing for homeland defense** need not become an either/or proposition in conflict with warfighting tasks. While focused on domestic contingencies, these assets may be made available to combatant commanders executing other national military strategy objectives. The military's relatively successful approach to peace operations is instructive. Advocates of suboptimizing argued unsuccessfully to create peacekeeping divisions trained specifically to perform these missions and no other. The US military resisted these suggestions, choosing instead to make some capability adjustments at the margins in terms of training support packages, doctrine, materiel, and the like. The final results of the comprehensive National Guard Bureau WMD Study will influence the outcome of that issue.<sup>24</sup>

#### DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Technology research and development projects include detection and identification of biological and chemical agents; personal protection; containment, mitigation and decontamination; and information management and training.<sup>25</sup> A key area for further examination is the identification and bridging of the **NBC delta**, the difference between the ability of "first responders" to deal with "normal" hazardous materials situations and those envisioned for WMD. Ironically this delta may also apply to the ability of "second responders" from the Federal government, especially the military, to deal with catastrophic NBC events off the traditional battlefield. As recently noted in a DOD IG report, the ability of military units to deal with such events on the battlefield is far from perfect.<sup>26</sup> The Foss-Downing Report notes as well the inappropriateness of fighting through an NBC event, when such an event might occur at a seaport or airfield.

# LESSONS LEARNED AND TO BE LEARNED

While much of the current efforts are new, the vast experience and lessons learned from our past remain with us to guide our work (e.g., lessons of Pearl Harbor captured by a congressional investigating committee).<sup>27</sup> These lessons learned include the need for a clear delineation of authority and responsibility; wide-spread information sharing; systematic and coordinated vigilance and evaluation of intelligence; imaginative, flexible, and resourceful leadership with true American grit; clear, forthright, and appropriate communications; and preparedness on all fronts, military and domestic. The Nation should be able to count on the capabilities of its military in all of these areas.

We also can be informed by the future. The Army After Next (AAN) Project is tapping its intellectual capital to disseminate pertinent insights for use in the present. Its 1998 Spring Wargame played homeland defense in a 2025 scenario. In the fall of 1998, the Army Medical Department also addressed the issue in an AAN franchise game.

Our allies who have confronted similar problems (e.g., the Homefront Command of the Israeli Defense Forces and the British and Korean Armies) can be helpful. The Canadian Army also has experience with major catastrophes, such as the crippling ice storm that occurred in eastern Ontario and Quebec in 1997. Such events have been called "nature's terrorists," as anyone who experienced one can attest.

Exercises, experiments, and battle laboratories are additional sources of knowledge and insight. The joint world is planning to introduce a concept of homeland defense into USACOM's near-term Joint Experimentation Plan.

#### A HOMELAND DEFENSE CONCEPT

Any military concept designed to confront threats to the homeland must consider all lessons learned and insights and account for the use of all available resources. Broadly conceived, such a concept might address force protection and antiterrorism, information and sensing operations, shaping operations, decisive operations, and movement and sustainment operations. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command is developing a White Paper for homeland defense. Fundamentals involved in this paper will include the use of military capabilities in a support role and subordination of the military to civilian authorities in a very direct manner and in accordance with US law. Warfighters will have to pay special attention to interagency coordination and private sector prerogatives and needs.

- Force protection and antiterrorism will be a critical component of homeland defense. Military programs are well-defined in regulations, handbooks, and directives; but could be improved in training exercises for US-based forces (e.g., movement from home station into combat training centers). Additionally, the Critical Asset Assurance Program now defined in a DOD directive, protection measures for responders and a downwind population, as well as contamination containment, require further thought and definition.
- Adequate computer defenses will be important, not only against terrorists, but against a relatively new phenomenon dubbed "hacksterism"—groups or individuals dedicated to attacking the World Wide Web sites of any person or company they deem responsible for oppression. Their new rallying cry is, "The revolution will be digitized."<sup>28</sup> The FBI has already organized a National Information Protection Center, manned by various agency representatives, and DOD now has its own JTF-Computer Network Defense.

- Seamless, integrated, and near-instantaneous detection and identification (sensing)capabilities of a highly technical nature are critical. Command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts will assist these efforts. The response and proactive measures must clearly demonstrate awesome speed, mastery of the situation, and provide accurate, relevant information to the NCA. The latter imperative is a lesson learned from Operation DESERT THUNDER.<sup>29</sup>
- Shaping homeland defense operations would consist of all actions taken using the full range of military power and information dominance to gain and maintain the initiative and set the conditions for decisive operations. These may include actions to deny an adversary entry to the homeland or the opportunity to compromise the electromagnetic spectrum; hack our computers; or to damage, degrade or otherwise harm other critical assets. These actions also will include our efforts to destroy or degrade an adversary's essential capabilities before they can be projected to our shores or used against our installations overseas. CIA, DIA, and FBI cooperation will be essential. The DOD role in facilitating domestic preparedness at the local level perhaps is the most important shaping operationalthough, by law, will not involve intelligence collection. Information operations may be used to dissuade adversaries through emphasis on declaratory policy options and the sure knowledge of overwhelming capabilities to defend ourselves. Shaping operations for homeland defense may also include positioning our forces at advantageous locations, where they may launch decisive crisis or consequence management operations.
- Decisive operations might consist of those actions which apply simultaneous, overwhelming military capabilities to create effects directly at decisive points (physical elements or events in time that offer the commander a marked advantage and greatly influence the outcome) or which achieve the immediate assigned objective.<sup>30</sup> Such actions could include, opening lines of communications (LOCs) for military assistance, the evacuation of casualties, reconnaissance, decontamination, or initial assessment and detection of NBC hazards, along with a host of activities like those employed following the 1995 bombing of the Murrah building in Oklahoma City, OK. Decisive operations may require bomb dogs, casualty assistance, electrical and structural engineering, medical assistance, imagery, explosive ordnance disposal, linguists, mortuary affairs, ground transportation, airlift and many other types of support.

• Sustainment operations may include all actions taken to preserve and ensure the functioning of the force and its capabilities and to ensure its freedom of action and ready deployment. In all types of operations these include combat service support and security of the sustainment base and associated LOCs. By their nature, sustainment operations are not normally decisive, but in homeland defense they are part of the very capability we are securing, and failure in these operations can cause the overall effort to fail.

#### SUMMARY

Much has been done to meet the Nation's need for homeland defense, but much more planning, decisionmaking, and follow-through is required. As Undersecretary of Defense John Hamre put it, "the next decade will be a decade of homeland defense."<sup>31</sup> Citizen Ryan is safe for now, but may face grave perils in the near future. As in the past, the US military will not let America down.

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### **USACOM JWFC WWW SITES**

The new USACOM JWFC Home Page is at *http://www.jwfc.acom.mil/*. It contains a link in the left column that takes you to the "Limited Access" page. Initial user registration and clearance may be required. The "Limited Access" page contains links to the USACOM JWFC divisions, electronic libraries, Joint Center for Lessons Learned, joint exercises and training information, modeling and simulation, joint training courseware, and on-line versions of some of our useful and informative publications.

NOTE: The joint doctrine POC listings in the on-line version of <u>A Common Perspective</u> at *http://www.jwfc.acom.mil/ltdaccess/protected/doctrine/* are updated as changes occur.



Col Brodel, Chief of the Doctrine Division from the USACOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and COL Del Turner, Acting Chief of the Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff (JS) welcomed the attendees.

ADM Gehman, CINCUSACOM, provided opening remarks. He emphasized that the JWFC is under new management, but the process has not changed the role of the JWFC as the "guys with the white hat" and the statutory responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not changed. When USACOM has an independent doctrinal issue it will be handled the same as for every other combatant command (he has only one vote in the process). He described the three pillars of jointness: technology commonality or interoperability; doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and leader development and education. He noted that all three are of equal importance. He summarized by stating that 1) what the attendees do here is a critically important process that has not changed, 2) USACOM's business plan is to be the chief advocate for joint doctrine and TTP, and 3) by exception, the CINC will take a key or long-standing joint doctrine issue to the Chairman for resolution.

Lt Col Tim Malone from J-7/JDD, JS provided a joint doctrine update. He discussed the content and issues associated with JPs 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," (in revision); 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats," (issues related to those in JP 3-09); 3-09.3, "JTTP for Close Air Support," (may be driven to early revision); 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense Operations," (change in title, change in scope); 3-14, "Joint Doctrine for Space Operations" (lengthy development time); 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations," (on hold for JP 3-01 issues); and JP 5-00.2, "JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures," (anticipate approval in 30 days). Lt Col Malone then described the Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET), which is an Internet-based distributed learning system linked to primary military education institutions. He noted that we are evolving toward the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS), which will be an interactive database of various reference documents planned for full operation by 2003. He announced that the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) would be updated weekly by COB on Thursdays.

**DISCUSSION**: Mr. Bounds from the USA noted e-mail tasking is not yet accepted. Lt Col Malone explained that the tasker is a signed e-mail attachment.

LTC Senkovich of the USACOM JWFC provided a JP assessment update information briefing. He reported that 43 assessments have been completed to date with nine in progress; three were voted not to be assessed, however, JPs 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," and 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security," will be assessed; and four voted for assessment have not been assessed. He concluded by stating the continuous assessment process has been institutionalized, noting that assessment data is on the USACOMJWFC Home Page, and that assessment reports are now categorized by the revision recommendation interim reports for normal revisions and final reports for immediate revisions.

Col Tim Murphy of J-3, JS provided a decision briefing on the disposition of JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations." He declared that the current draft of JP 3-56 has two shortcomingsit duplicates published doctrine and other publications fulfill many of the original program directive (PD) requirements. He concluded that work on JP 3-56 should end, but recommended convening a joint working group (JWG) to determine the C2 holes that need filling and how. Maj Miller of the USACOM JWFC provided the front-end analysis (FEA) that recommended discontinuing the current effort and convening a JWG to examine the issues and provide recommendations to the joint doctrine development community. Mr. Bounds of HQDA agreed that we need to stop work on JP 3-56, but supports a separate JP, and echoed the need for a JWG. The JDWP voted unanimously to discontinue work on JP 3-56 and convene a formal JWG led by the J-3, JS and USA to provide a recommendation to the J-7 within 90 days [for further dissemination to the joint doctrine development community] concerning the following issues: (1) What shortfalls exist in joint command and control doctrine?; (2) Based upon the answer, should there be a separate JP or should C2 issues be folded into existing publications?; (3) If a separate pub is required, what number should it be?; (4) determine the disposition of remaining original PD required topics, and develop a new draft scope of the program directive.

COL M. Y. Kenneally of J-4, JS provided a decision brief on a proposal to develop "Joint Total Distribution **Doctrine.**" He noted that three JPs in development cover pieces of distribution, but a void exists in total distribution guidance-from origin to the customer. He recommended developing JP 4-XX and assigning the Defense Logistics Agency as the LA and J-4 as the Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor (JSDS). LTC Henderson of the USACOM JWFC provided a FEA, which recommended approval of the proposal and designating the J-4, JS as the LA and JSDS. Lt Col Hinger of the USAF stated that a good case for a stand-alone publication was not made. COL Kenneally replied that inclusion in another publication does not provide enough overarching guidance. **VOTE:** The JDŴP voted 12-2 (USAF and USN dissented) for a stand-alone publication on total distribution with J-4 as the LA and JSDS.

LTC Frank Abbott of TRADOC/JADD provided a decision brief on a proposal to develop "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)." He noted joint doctrine on MOUT would respond to the reality that operations in cities are increasingly likely, and joint doctrine in a stand-alone JP is needed. It was recommended that the USA serve as LA and the USMC as the technical review authority (TRA). LTC Senkovich of the USACOM JWFC provided the **FEA**, which recommended incorporating operational-level considerations in the JP 3-0 revision, USA/ USMC collaboration as TRAs, and exploration of a J-MOUT handbook. LtCol Larry Brown from the USMC explained that the Marines believe MOUT is a complex operation where all joint force capabilities are required; there are significant differences in application of the principles of war; there are two dominant features, infrastructure and noncombatants; thus a separate JP is needed. He added that the Marine Corps should be the LA and the Commandant supports the effort. Lt Col Hinger from the USAF noted that no one presented an example where a JFC could not develop a campaign plan because there was inadequate MOUT doctrine. A representative from J-8, JS noted that there is unanimous consensus for joint MOUT doctrine and a handbook is needed in the near future. VOTE: The JDWP voted 12-2 (the USAF and USSPACECOM dissented) to develop a separate publication on joint doctrine for MOUT. The LA issue will be addressed separately.

Lt Col Bobby Clegg of the Joint Combat Rescue Agency (JCRA) representing the USAF provided a decision brief on the realignment and consolidation of the JP 3-50 series. He reviewed the 1995 JDWPs' decisions that called for development of a new JP 3-50 on "Personnel Recovery" and consolidation of JPs 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue," and 3-50.21, "JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue." He proposed the re-designation and expansion of JP 3-50.2 as JP 3-50, "Joint Doctrine for Combat Recovery;" re-designating JP 3-50.21 as 3-50.1; re-designating JP 3-50.3, "Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery," as JP 3-50.2, "JTTP for Evasion and Recovery;" and redesignating existing JPs 3-50, "National Search and Rescue Manual, Vol I," and 3-50.1, "National Search and Rescue Manual, Vol II," as JP 3-49 Vol I and Vol II. He explained consolidation of JPs 3-50.2 and 3-50.21 is not desired by the field and would complicate JP use for the warfighter. Furthermore, JPs 3-50 and 3-50.1 focus on civil search and rescue (SAR) and should not be in the hierarchy of combat recovery. CDR Bentz of the USACOM JWFC provided a **FEA**, which recommended approval. **VOTE**: The JDWP voted unanimously to approve the USAF recommendation.

CDR Bob Crumpler from the J-7/EAD, JS provided an information brief on exercise trends.

LTC Rex Dudley from the J-2, JS provided an information brief on the status of the JP 2-0 series publications. Among other items, JP 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations," is awaiting resolution of the term "battlespace;" JP 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," is undergoing a major rewrite; and JP 2-01.3, "JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace," (PC) is being prepared and will address the definition of "battlespace."

CW4 Alfred Rice of ARCENT provided an information brief on "Risk Management (RM) and Joint Doctrine, Training, and Operations in the Joint Task Force." He recommended developing a handbook on RM for joint planners.

Professor Michael J. Morin of the USA War College provided an information brief on "Standardizing a Force Projection Operation." He stated that the eight stages of the force projection process (mobilization phases, predeployment phases, deployment, entry operations, decisive operations, transition to post-conflict operations, redeployment phases, and demobilization phases) should be standardized in joint doctrine. COL Kenneally noted that J-4, JS feels that the eight stages described in the presentation are embedded in joint doctrine, but as four phases.

COL Michael Smith, Director, TRADOC/JADD provided an information brief on "Homeland Defense." He provided a proposed definition and suggested that joint doctrine should be developed on the subject.

MAJ James LaRusch of TRADOC/JADD provided an information brief on "Contractors on the Battlefield." He recommended the joint community continue research to determine if joint doctrine on contractor support is needed.

Maj Hardison of HQ Marine Corps provided an information brief on the "Joint Close Air Support (CAS) Symposium." He discussed the symposium takeaways and noted that future issues included the update of JP 3-09.3.

Group Captain Graham McMellin from the Permanent Joint Headquarters of the United Kingdom (UK) provided an information brief on the "UK Strategic Defense Review," and LTC Simon Doughty gave a joint doctrine update. LTC Doughty emphasized that they are taking a multinational focus and their doctrine must be consistent with NATO doctrine.

LTC Senkovich of the USACOM JWFC reviewed the JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," assessment report results, which recommended expanding several sections. COL Brown of the J-3, JS noted subjects to be included in the revision are USACOM as a force provider, information operations, consequence management, logistics (disposal and environmental), countering air and missile threats, MOOTW (training and readiness), and post-conflict considerations. Mr. Bounds of the USA stated that he felt it was important to understand that other keystone publications support JP 3-0. Col Brodel cautioned against using JP 3-0 as a pulpit for forcing change in other publications.

A JDWP round-table open discussion addressed, among other items, changes to electronic read-ahead packages, revisiting JS funding for printing JPs, a joint doctrine calendar on the WWW, SIPRNET use, lead agency for joint doctrine for MOUT, adopting an official dictionary, and the lack of discussion/information on JP 3-0 issues.

COL Turner thanked the USACOM JWFC for their efforts in hosting the conference and announced the next JDWP would be held during April 1999.



# **JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS**

### **SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS**

PI IR#

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-01, Rev2	Joint Doctrine Publication System	3-16	Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
1-01.1 Rev1	Compendium of Joint Publications	3-33	Joint Force Capabilities
1-06	JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations	3-35	Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations
2-0 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations	3-51 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
2-01.1	JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting	3-55 Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
2-03	JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to		Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA)
	Joint Operations	4-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
3-01	Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats	4-01.4	JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution
3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	4-01.8	JTTP for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
3-07.7	JTTP for Domestic Support Operations		Integration
3-09.1 Rev1	JTTP for Laser Target Designation Operations	5-00.1	JTTP for Campaign Planning
3-01 3-07.6 3-07.7	Joint Operations Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance JTTP for Domestic Support Operations	4-01.4 4-01.8	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operation JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution JTTP for Reception, Staging, Onward Movemen Integration

PUB#

### **IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT** 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
0-2 Rev2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
2-01.2 Rev1	Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support
	to Operations
3-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-11 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Operating in a Nuclear, Biological, and
	Chemical Environment
3-13.1 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-17 Rev1	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
3-49 Rev1	National Search and Rescue Manual
3-55.1 Rev1	JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
3-57 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
4-01.3 Rev1	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.5 Rev1	JTTP for Terminal Operations
4-02 Rev1	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-04 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

### **APPROVED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1998** TITLE

1-0	Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
2-02	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
3-07.3 Rev1	JTTP for Peace Operations
3-13	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-15 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Barriers Obstacles and Mine Warfare
3-59 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic
	Operations
4-01.6 Rev1	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS)
4-05.1	JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization
	Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup
5-00.2 Rev1	Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures

### **UNDER ASSESSMENT**

PUB#	TITLE
3-03	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations
3-07.4	Joint Counterdrug Operations
3-07.5	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3-08	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations
3-54	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-61	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System

### WITHIN 12 MONTH ASSESSMENT WINDOW

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-05	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations	3-50.21	JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue
2-02	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations	3-52*	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-01.4*	JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Defenses (J-SEAD)	3-56.1*	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-04.1	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations	4-02.1	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations	G	Joint Operations
3-07.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism	4-03	Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support	4-05*	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
3-10*	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations	6-0*	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and
3-10.1*	JTTP for Base Defense		Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

\* Denotes final assessment, all others are interim assessments

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Navy Warfare **Development Command** Sims Hall 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 username number **CAPT R. Nestlerode** (nestlerr) 4201 CAPT R. Bahr (bahrr) 4203 **CAPT R. Miller** (millerrj) 4204 LCDR J. Stamos LCDR J. Moorman (stamosj) 7063 4176 (moormanj) FAX 7816 DSN 948-XXXX/Com (401) 841-XXXX E-mail (username)@nwc.navy.mil Navy Warfare **Development Command Norfolk Division 1540 Gilbert Street** Norfolk, VA 23511-2785 username number CDR T. Tucker 🕰 0565 (ttucker) FAX 0570/1 DSN 565-XXXX/Com (757) 445-XXXX E-mail (username)@ndc.navy.mil Air Land Sea **Application (ALSA) Center** 114 Andrews St Langley, AFB VA 23665-2785 username number Col E. Modica (edward.modica) 0960 CDR J. Woodard (jim.woodard) 0967 (william.zoellers) 0962 LTC D. Zoellers LTC E. Bilyeu (elisabeth.bilyeu) 0905 LTC L. Fowler (lawrence.fowler) 0853 LTC B. Morris (brett.morris) 0964 0851 LtCol J. Callaway (james.callaway) MAJ W. Deneff (wayne.deneff) 0854 Maj P. Woodson (penny.woodson) 0961 Maj S. Chewning (sheila.chewning) 0906 Maj K. Feaga (keith.feaga) 0963 Maj M. Vehr 0966 (mary.vehr) Maj L. McDonald (louis.mcdonald) 0903 Maj R. McManus (ronald.mcmanus)0968 Maj R. Starkey (richard.starkey) 0965 Mrs. D. Haba (diane.haba) 0908 0849 Mrs. T. Houston (tracy.houston) 0089 FAX DSN 575-XXXX/Com (757) 225-XXXX E-mail(username)@langley.af.mil legend Terminologist \* JP Distribution Members of the


**Joint Doctrine** 

**Other Service** 

Working Party (JDWP)

E-Mail addresses appear as (username)

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### DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

### JOINT STAFF, J-7, JOINT DOCTRINE DIVISION (JDD)

#### By COL S. Schook, USA, Division Chief

#### JOINT DOCTRINE NEWS

**Personnel.** LTC Ed Daily is no longer working joint doctrine issues. Ed was a valuable team member and will be missed. Two remaining JDD members are now tracking his publications. CDR Ruth Mohr took JPs 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Operating in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment" (first draft), 3-34, "Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations" (second draft), and 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support." CDR Bryon Ing took JPs 4-05, "Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning," and 4-05.1, "JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup." Unfortunately, this arrangement will be short lived. The summer rotation is fast approaching and both CDR Mohr and CDR Ing will leave JDD along with Lt Col Tim Malone. They will be sorely missed.

Joint Publications Printing Status. The responsible agent for printing unclassified publications shifted from the Joint Staff to the USACOM-JWFC on 1 October 1998. Hopefully, consolidating distribution and printing responsibilities will close the time gap between approval and delivery. JDD will continue to produce the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) CD-ROM, classified joint doctrine publications and annexes, and other special doctrine products, as appropriate. The key to responsive printing and distribution is the timely submission of distribution lists from the combatant commands and Services and funding data from the Services. The following publications are approved, posted on the World Wide Web, at the printer, and scheduled for distribution soon.

- JEL CD-ROM February 1999 version
- JP 1-0, "Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations"
- JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"
- JP 3-07.3, "JTTP for Peace Operations"
- JP 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations"

- JP 3-15, "Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare"
- JP 3-59, "JTTP for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations"
- JP 4-01.6, "JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the Shore (JLOTS)"
- JP 4-05.1, "JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup"
- JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures"

The following publications are currently in the approval process and will be next in the print queue:

- JP 1-01.1, "Compendium of Joint Publications"
- JP 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations"
- JP 2-03, "JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations"
- JP 3-09.1, "Joint Laser Designation Procedures"
- JP 3-33, "Joint Force Capabilities"

**Doctrine Networked Education and Training** (**DOCNET**) is an Internet-based education and training package for the total force. It will be tailored to various audiences-formal schools, just-in-time training, refresher training, etc.. Five of 30 modules are now complete and accessible to you on the Joint Doctrine Home Page at: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/tointer.htm* (password protected). Let us know what you think.

**Electronic Distribution**. Classified joint doctrine publications and draft joint doctrine publications are now available on the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). In addition, the information on GCCS is updated weekly. We continue to solicit your inputs on this initiative, as well as all our products.

**CJCS Directives**. The joint warfighting community's need for convenient user accessibility to CJCS directives referenced in joint doctrine prompted the placement of all appropriate CJCS directives on the Joint Doctrine Home Page JEL and the JEL CD-ROM. This initiative is nearing completion. Only 18 CJCS directives remain to be processed out of an original 166. In addition to CJCS directives, all remaining memorandums of policy are currently available.

Allied Joint Doctrine (NATO). The allied joint operations doctrine community has begun the development of allied joint publications (AJP) to support the agreed upon hierarchy. While the AJP development program closely emulates our joint publications development *(Continued on next page)*  program, there are differences in publication categories and content. JDD is actively involved in the AJP development process. Interoperability is key and we are working hard to ensure consistency with joint doctrine. Accordingly, a message was sent to the appropriate commands with the breakdown of US points of contacts and responsibilities for the various AJPs.

**1999 NATO English Speaking Nations (ESN) Terminology Conference**. The 1999 ESN Terminology Conference was hosted by the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence from 15 to 19 March 1999. Last year the US hosted the conference in Arlington, VA. The agenda included 141 separate terminology proposal lists, or "PLs." An increasing number of PLs are now coming from the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (e.g., antiair warfare and noncombatant evacuation operations). Proposals which become "ESN Agreed" may be placed on an ESN Agreed List to facilitate resolution by correspondence. In other instances, where the French Speaking Nations or "FSN" have reached corresponding agreements in French, the proposals may be circulated among NATO Nations for resolution on an ESN/FSN Agreed List. Proposals not judged likely to be resolved by further correspondence will be discussed at follow-on meetings at NATO headquarters with the ESN/FSN nations (US, UK, Canada, France, and Belgium) as well as the major NATO commands and other nations participating in the NATO Standardization Programme.

Ultimately, terms and definitions that become "NATO Agreed" will be placed in AAP-6, "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)," and considered by the US and other NATO nations for possible incorporation into their own national military and associated terminology. Readers of JP 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," will notice many instances of established standardization between the US and NATO. If a JP 1-02 entry has an asterisk in parentheses after the term, this signifies DOD-NATO standardization.

#### JOINT VISION NEWS

**Organizational Changes**. Capt Julie Walker, USAF Intern, recently left the Joint Vision Branch to attend George Washington University as a full time student. Replacing Julie is fellow USAF intern, Capt Bill "Spanky" Spangenthal, KC-135R pilot, from Grand Forks, ND.

#### JV 2010 Implementation

CJCSI 3010.02, "The Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)" was signed on 9 December 1998. The JIMP describes an implementation process consisting of three iterative, continuous components-concept development, concept and capabilities exploration and assessment, and integration.

The Joint Staff Coordinating Authorities have led collaborative teams; including representatives from combatant commands, Services and Defense Agencies; in the initial concept development efforts. These teams examined the 21st Century challenges we'll face in employing our armed forces in 2010 and the desired operational capabilities (DOCs) the joint force commander needs to meet those challenges. The 72 DOCs developed do not represent a final, comprehensive list of desired future capabilities. DOCs will be added, deleted, and changed as we put them through rigorous assessment. USACOM, collaborating with the joint community, published Campaign Plan 99 in December 1998, describing how USACOM will execute the responsibilities of Executive Agent for Joint Experimentation. Campaign Plan 99 also includes eight concepts for early experimentation that will be developed over the next three years. USACOM is currently developing Campaign Plan 00, to be published in late Spring.

*JV 2010* implementation requires co-evolving the elements of military capability embodied by joint doctrine, organizations, joint training and education, leader development, and people. This co-evolution requires integrated, parallel change processes to shorten the time to implement approved changes from the Joint Vision assessment phase. It also requires the joint community to be involved in *JV 2010* implementation, from concept development through integration.

**Joint Technological Initiatives Symposium**. The *JV* 2010 staff is working closely with USACOM to develop and co-host a Joint Technology Initiatives Symposium during mid to late 1999. This symposium would provide a forum for military, industry, academia, and technology representatives to introduce mid and far term joint warfighting concepts entering the joint experimentation phase and identify off-the-shelf and new technology solutions to support joint warfighting concepts. We envision an exciting and informative symposium divided into general/ plenary sessions, breakout panel sessions, and possibly some commercial exhibits.

*JV 2010* Multi-Media. The *JV 2010* staff is updating its *JV 2010* World Wide Web site at: *www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ JV2010*. The updates will include our current briefings, documents and publications (JIMP, 21st Century Challenges, DOCs, etc.), points of contacts, and Internet hyperlinks.

**Questions or Comments?** If you have any questions or comments about *JV 2010* please e-mail us at: *JV2010@js.pentagon.mil.* 

JOINT DOCTRINE WEB SITE ON GCCS

http://nmcc20a/users/dj9j7ead/doctrine/index.html

### JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)

#### By COL Bristol Williams, USA, Director

JADD writes and reviews doctrine in accordance with JP 1-01, "Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program" and the TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program. JADD continues to serve as the chair and host for the Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference and as TRADOC's executive agent for interface with the combatant commands, Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, and the other Service doctrine centers and commands. JADD's Director is COL Bristol Williams. He can be reached at DSN 680-3951 or e-mail: *williamsb@monroe.army.mil.* Your questions or comments are truly welcome.

**Army Doctrine (AD) XXI.** JADD is pursuing a series of initiatives to develop and implement a doctrinal system tailored to meet the needs of the Army in the 21st Century. Overall, the AD XXI concept recognizes the increasingly joint, interagency, and multinational nature of military operations. Additionally, it underscores the need to exploit information technologies and automation to enhance effectiveness, improve efficiency, and reduce costs in the development, production, distribution, and use of Army doctrine.

Specific proposals included in this concept were presented to the CG, TRADOC, in November 1997. The primary recommendation was to revise the Army doctrine numbering system to conform with the joint doctrine numbering system and to redesign the Army doctrine hierarchy in a fashion similar to the joint doctrine hierarchy. This proposal has been favorably reviewed by all TRADOC schools/centers and the field Army. JADD has forwarded a proposal to the Army staff for potential inclusion in JP 1-01 that places all possible joint doctrine numbers into three categories: used, reserved, and available for Serviceunique requirements.

Since the November 1997 briefing to the CG, TRADOC, JADD has refined the initiatives of AD XXI to include institutionalizing a Reserve Component Outreach Program to expand the role of the US Army's Reserve Component (Army Reserves and National Guard) in Army doctrine development. This initiative recognizes that future US military operations will draw extensively on the capabilities found in the US Army's Reserve Components. Moreover, there is a broadly accepted sensing that the myriad changes in US Army doctrine, AD XXI related refinements, and several other factors require the active participation of and close coordination with the US Army's Reserve Components. Our POC is LTC Mike Goodwin at DSN 680-3560 or e-mail: *goodwinm@ monroe.army.mil*.

The Doctrine Developer's Course (DDC) is a component of the AD XXI initiative. It provides officers and noncommissioned officers who are newly assigned to doctrine positions with the basic knowledge to effectively and efficiently develop, write, staff, and publish Army doctrine. Participants receive hands on training with the Automated Systems Approach to Training-Doctrine Module, the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned's Virtual Research Library. While the mass of doctrine and TTP is increasing due to AD XXI initiatives and new Army operations, our personnel and budget resources are declining. The DDC helps doctrine proponents maximize use of their limited doctrine related resources. The course mitigates these resource shortfalls by providing doctrinewriters with " how to" guidance, thereby reducing the ramp-up time for newcomers. Future plans indicate the DDC will be exportable via CD ROM and offered in distance learning facilities and/or on the Internet. Until an exportable package is developed, classroom sessions will be conducted quarterly. The next DDC sessions are scheduled for 3-6 May 1999 and 16-19 August 1999. Our POC is LTC Ken Gaines at DSN 680-4225 or e-mail: gainesk@monroe.army.mil.

"Joint Warfighters" Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) was chartered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in June 1997. The focus of "Joint Warfighters" is the prosecution of time-sensitive surface targets in joint operations. TRADOC is the Army's sponsor. The actual test phase will be a three-year effort with a proposed OSD budget of approximately \$20 million and up to 60 military, civilian, and contractor personnel from all the Services' T&E agencies. Our POC is LTC Watkins at DSN 680-4134 or e-mail: *watkinsd@ monroe.army.mil*.

**Homeland Defense**. JADD became the office of primary responsibility for TRADOC involvement in examining the implications of the National Defense Panel recommendation regarding Army doctrine and related developments in homeland defense. Our POC is Mr. Richard Rinaldo at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *rinaldor@monroe.army.mil*. The alternate POC is Mr. Larry Heystek at DSN 680-4489 or e-mail: *heystekl@monroe.army.mil*.

**Consequence Management.** JADD continues to monitor development of the consequence management concept, which is closely related to homeland defense requirements, with a view toward changes in both joint *(Continued on next page)*  and Army doctrine. A short briefing with references on this topic can be found at *www.tradoc.army.mil/docdocs*. Our POC is Mr. Richard Rinaldo at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *rinaldor@monroe.army.mil*.

NATO Doctrine Program. LTC Watkins from JADD is the US Head of Delegation to the NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine and Operational Procedures Working Party. He is responsible for establishing the US position in coordination with Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine organizations on 17 standing and 7 proposed NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). He also serves as the custodian for two of these 17 STANAGs: 2014, "Operations, Warning and Admin/Service Support Orders," and 2020, "Operational Situation Reports." Additionally, he is the Army POC for the Amphibious Warfare Working Party and the Air Operations Working Party, responsible for coordination of the Army position on the STANAGs maintained by these groups. Furthermore, he coordinates the TRADOC position for all other pertinent STANAGs. LTC Watkins may be reached at DSN 680-4134 or e-mail: watkinsd@ monroe.army.mil.

#### **KEY PUBLICATIONS/PROJECTS**

FM 100-5, "Operations." The 1998 edition of FM 100-5 will be the 14th in a series that began in 1905 and it will be the second edition published since the end of the Cold War. It will reflect the lessons of nearly a decade of postcold war experience, assessments of technological advancements, sound theory, and an appreciation of proven fundamentals and principles. It will address the full range of operations the US Army expects to execute in the foreseeable future-offense, defense, stability, and support. It confirms that the Nation will, as it has for 200 years, call on the US Army to conduct a wide array of military operations. In October 1997, the US Army Combined Arms Command (CAC) completed initial Army-wide staffing of the final draft. Subsequently, changes were made and a revised final draft was developed and staffed Army-wide. Additional information is available on the CAC Home Page at: http://wwwcgsc.army.mil/cdd/f465/f465.htm. Our POC is LTC Gaines at DSN 680-4225 or e-mail: gainesk@monroe.army.mil.

#### NOTE: Joint publication drafts described below may be found in the "draft pubs" (password protected) section of the Joint Electronic Library on the Internet at: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jointpub.htm*.

JP 3-07.3, "JTTP for Peace Operations" (final coordination (FC)), expands the work done in the previously approved JP 3-07.3, "JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations," by including peace enforcement. This publication was approved on 12 February 1999. Our POC is Mr. Rinaldo at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *rinaldor@ monroe.army.mil*.

JP 3-07.6, "JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance" (PC), describes the interface and coordination required between the joint task force (JTF) and other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations likely to be operating during foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Consequence management concepts have been incorporated. Our POC is Mr. Rinaldo at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *rinaldo@ monroe.army.mil.* 

JP 3-07.7, "JTTP for Domestic Support Operations" (preliminary coordination (PC)), contains procedures for joint forces in conducting support to civil authorities and law enforcement agencies within the continental US, Alaska and Hawaii, and US territories and possessions. Our POC is Mr. Rinaldo at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *rinaldor@monroe.army.mil.* 

JP 3-09.1, "JTTP for Laser Target Designation Operations," provides planners and users with information on laser designators, acquisition devices, and laser-guided munitions. It describes laser planning and coordination procedures and laser system capabilities and operations. The publication also provides guidance regarding safety considerations, general information on laser codes, and reference information.. The revision is in FC. Our POC is LTC Watkins at DSN 680-4134 or e-mail: *watkinsd@monroe.army.mil* 

JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare'' (FC), provides pertinent guidelines for the planning and execution of a theater strategy, campaigns, and joint operations during peacetime or combat operations. It describes command and control, employment, and countering enemy employment. It was approved on 24 February 1999. Our POC is LTC Ham at DSN 680-3444 e-mail: *hams@monroe.army.mil*.

JP 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations" (PC), addresses forcible entry principles associated with command and control, planning, execution, and support, as well as the interface between airborne, special operations forces, and naval expeditionary forces (amphibious forces). OurPOC is LTC Ham at DSN 680-3444 or e-mail: hams@monroe.army.mil.

JP 3-34, "Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations" (second draft (SD)), was approved for development by the 22-23 October 1996 JDWP. The Army has been assigned as the lead agent (LA) and TRADOC as the primary review authority. The Joint Staff J-4 is the joint staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS). It will provide joint force commanders and their staffs with current engineer doctrine across the range of military operations. The SD was distributed for worldwide review during April 1998. Our POC is LTC Ham at DSN 680-3444 or e-mail: hams@monroe.army.mil.

JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations" (SD). The October 1998 JDWP voted to discontinue work on the current version of JP 3-56 and convene a JP 3-56 Working Group (WG) to, among other tasks:

- 1. Identify what shortfalls exist in joint C2 doctrine.
- 2. Based on the answer to #1, should there be a separate joint publication on C2 or should C2 issues be folded into existing Joint Publications?
- 3. Provide recommendations to the Joint Staff, J-7 within 90 days.

The Joint Staff J-3 as the JSDS and the Army as the LA cochaired the WG, which met during December 1998. The WG identified numerous joint C2 subject areas, but was undecided about the adequacy of coverage in joint publications. Consequently, the USACOM JWFC was tasked to conduct a formal study. The study results have been reviewed by the co-chairs and a decision brief will be presented at the April 1999 JDWP. Our POC is LTC Abbott at DSN 680-3892 or e-mail: *abbottf@monroe. army.mil*.

JP4-07, "JTTP for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations" (FD), will standardize guidance across logistics functional areas and provide a single source publication for conducting common user logistics operations within a theater and a joint task force. The PD was approved on 16 June 1997. Our POC is LTC Maurer at DSN 680-2888 or e-mail: *maurerc1@monroe.army.mil*.

**JP 5-00.1, "JTTP for Campaign Planning" (PC),** provides fundamental principles for planning theater and subordinate campaigns. It expands on guidance found in JPs 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations." It focuses on the application of operational art, elements of design, and the integration of strategic and operational functions. The publication is undergoing revisions directed by the Joint Staff intended to clarify introductory principles, more closely integrate the elements of design with the campaign model, and expand the discussion of subordinate campaign planning. Our POC is LTC Ham at DSN 680-3444 or e-mail: *hams@monroe.army.mil.* 

### NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

#### By CDR John Stamos, USN

The Doctrine Department of the new Navy Warfare Development Command is forging ahead at flank speed towards its goal of being fully functional by June 1999. The Doctrine Department will rely on the successes achieved by the Naval Doctrine Command in Norfolk, VA and build on them in Newport, RI. Five of the 11 officers that will make up the Doctrine Department in Newport, RI are now aboard and are quickly diving into their expanding responsibilities as the Norfolk, VA offices are drawn down to a small detachment. In addition to being the Navy's single point of contact for all joint and international doctrine issues, the Doctrine Department will work closely with the Concepts Development Department and the Maritime Battle Center to develop the Navy's future fleet doctrine. Along with academic and administrative support from the Naval War College, Doctrine Division will rely heavily on support from the Navy "Centers Of Excellence" such as the Surface Warfare Development Group, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, and Submarine Development Squadron Twelve in their development and maintenance of Navy Doctrine. The Doctrine Department is poised to tackle the rapidly changing doctrinal issues of the 21st Century.

### HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ AFDC)

#### By Lt Col Marc Moss, USAF, AFDC Det 1

HQ AFDC Detachment 1 was sad to see the departure of two members of the original Langley doctrine team. Lt Col Kathleen Nelson, who brought great depth of knowledge and experience from the command and control (C2) world, began leave, which will culminate at her retirement on 26 March 1999. Col Wade McRoberts (also known as McBob) transferred to the Pentagon to be Chief of the Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine Division (USAF/XOPS), affectionately known as the "Skunk Works." Col McRoberts was instrumental in standing up the AFDC. These two have left their indelible signature on many of the Air Force and joint publications, we wish them well. Lt Col Chuck Sutherland will be the Deputy for Doctrine Development, while Lt Col Marc Moss will be the Deputy for Doctrine Application.

#### JOINT PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

**JP 3-17, "Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations."** The program directive was finalized in November 1998. New JP 3-17 will consolidate three publications; current JP 3-17, "JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations," (intratheater piece), JP 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations" (intertheater piece), and JP 3-18.1, "JTTP for Airborne and Air Assault Operations" (in development). New JP 3-17 will also include sections on air refueling, a first for joint doctrine, and have an expanded mission support section. The first draft should be available near the time of this printing.

(Continued on next page)

**JP 3-60, "Doctrine for Joint Targeting."** Our Joint Integration Directorate hosted a Joint Doctrine Working Group (JDWG) from 20-23 October 1998 to review the proposed changes to the first draft and to produce a second draft, which is due for worldwide review soon. **Key first draft issues included**:

- Current joint targeting terminology does not adequately describe the joint targeting process across the range of military operations (e.g., MOOTW).
- The current six-phase joint targeting process diagram published in JPs 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," and 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting" (final coordination), does not adequately describe the dynamics between joint and component command levels.
- There is a need to include standardized, desired targeting effects definitions in the glossary and text.

The JDWG felt that it resolved many of the issues. As lead agent, our overall objective is to bring JP 3-60 to the preliminary coordination stage by August 1999. For more information, see the separate article in this issue on page 32.

#### AIR FORCE PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

As a result of the recent CORONA SOUTH Conference (meeting of Air Force four-star Generals), Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDD) will not be renumbered to mirror the joint publication numbering system. Instead, each publication will incorporate a banner on the title page that describes its relationship to the joint doctrine hierarchy. All AFDDs are available for download, review, and comment at *http://www. doctrine.af.mil.* 

**AFDD 2, "Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power,"** is the companion piece to AFDD 1, "Air Force Basic Doctrine," that describes how the Air Force organizes and employs throughout the range of military operations. It was approved and published on 28 September 1998, but is being revised to incorporate Expeditionary Air Force terminology and comments from the recent CORONA. It will not be published in hard copy until the revisions are complete, but is available electronically at *http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil* or *http://usafdoctrine.maxwell.af.mil*.

**AFDD 2-1.2, "Strategic Attack,"** establishes doctrine guiding the employment of Air Force assets in those operations intended to achieve strategic effects by striking directly at the enemy's center(s) of gravity. Strategic attack seizes upon the capability of aerospace power to achieve decisive effects by disrupting C2, communications, and war-sustaining capabilities; while avoiding a sequential fight through layers of surface forces.

**AFDD 2-1.5, "Nuclear Operations,"** was published in 1998. Part of the "Air Warfare" series of doctrine documents, it examines the planning and conduct of nuclear operations at both the global and theater level. It offers the Air Force perspective on the use of nuclear weapons. It also suggests considerations for joint and Air Force commanders planning the employment of nuclear weapons in a theater.

**AFDD 2-1.6, "Combat Search and Rescue,"** was approved on 30 September 1998. It describes the roles and responsibilities of Air Force personnel supporting combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations and outlines principles for planning and executing CSAR operations. It further discusses organization and C2 of Air Force CSAR forces.

**AFDD 2-4.3, "Education and Training,"** published in 1998, discusses the Air Force's beliefs on the best way to prepare airmen for current and future operations. It examines the differences between education and training, showing how they complement each other to create highly skilled personnel with strong analytical and critical thinking abilities. Discussions of the continuum of education and the various levels of training demonstrate how these concepts apply throughout an airman's career.

**AFDD 2-5**, "**Information Operations**," describes how the Air Force will organize and employ its information warfare and information-in-warfare capabilities throughout the range of military operations. It was approved and published on 5 August 1998.

**AFDD 2-5.5, "Psychological Operations,"** was approved on 22 February 1997. It is being revised to incorporate current information operations trends and to update organization and employment of USAF psychological operations (PSYOP) forces. It discusses the PSYOP mission, its benefits and objectives, C2 relationships, air campaign planning, and support considerations.

**AFDD 2-7.1, "Foreign Internal Defense,"** approved on 2 February 1998, describes fundamental Air Force roles for foreign internal defense (FID) and advises commanders about how to employ and integrate Air Force resources to achieve FID objectives. It discusses the operational environment, C2, planning considerations, and training.

#### **QUOTABLE QUOTE**

"We are very short of money so we must start to think."

Lord Rutherford, 1871-1937, British Physicist

### MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

#### By Col Larry K. Brown, Jr., USMC, Director

The Joint Branch of MCCDC's Doctrine Division is presently engaged in several aviation issues relevant to the joint community. The two areas of concern involve JPs 3-09.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," and 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats."

MCCDC is closely monitoring the progress of JP 3-01, since its contentious issues will likely be addressed at a Pentagon Tank session in the near future. Our concern is the implied senior-subordinate relationship that results between the joint force air component commander, area air defense commander, and the airspace control authority.

Lastly, the Doctrine Division Joint Branch has welcomed two new members. LtCol Mark Triplett reported aboard Doctrine Division to assume duties as Head of the Joint/Amphibious Branch. LtCol Triplett came from Third Marine Expeditionary Force where he served as the force fires coordinator. He can be reached by telephone at DSN 278-2871 or e-mail: *triplettm@quantico.usmc.mil*. Major Carl Haselden reported aboard as a joint doctrine action officer. Major Haselden formerly served as the NATO/EUCOM plans officer on the staff of Commander, Amphibious Group Two, at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. Major Haselden can be reach by telephone at DSN 278-3617 or e-mail: *haseldence@ quantico.usmc.mil*.

# AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

#### By Col Ed Modica, USAF, Director

ALSA is under new management. In accordance with our multiservice memorandum of agreement, the ALSA directorship rotates every 18 months, alternating between the Army and the Air Force. Accordingly, I took the helm on 1 December 1998 from COL Bristol Williams, USA. The good news is that we expect to continue working closely with COL Williams, who has been reassigned as the Director of the Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate at HQ TRADOC.

We have been keeping busy. Along with continuing to host working groups and develop publications at a record pace, we also have installed communications and connectivity advances. First among these is a new phone system, which provides individual phone numbers for all ALSA personnel. Please review the "Joint Doctrine Points of Contact" section on page 21 for the updated ALSA phone list. Additionally, we have continued to improve our on-line presence. We have supplemented our unclassified ALSA Home Page, *http://www.dtic.mil/alsa*, with a SIPRNET site, *http://www.acc.langley.af.smil.mil/alsa*. Still under development, this site will soon contain all of our classified and distribution restricted publications, as well as providing a convenient resource for staffing classified drafts.

Since the previous issue of <u>A Common Perspective</u>, ALSA has released four publications. The following multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) are now available through Service publication channels or via our Home Page:

- "JATC Multiservice Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control" (FM 100-104, MCRP 3-25A, NWP 3-56.3, AFTTP(I) 3-2.23)
- "NLW-Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons" (FM 90-40, MCRP 3-15.8, NWP 3-07.31, USCG Pub 3-07.31)
- "JTF-IM Multiservice Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management" (FM 101-4, MCRP 6-23A, NWP 3-13.1.16, AFTTP (I) 3-2.22)
- "NIGHT Multiservice Procedures for Night and Adverse Weather Operations" (FM 90-22, MCRP 3-35A)

We continue developmental work on our other projects. These include the following:

"MTTP for Aviation Operations on Urban Terrain" will address the preparation and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation operations on urban terrain. It provides a source of reference material to assist ground personnel and aircrew in planning and coordinating tactical air-to-ground operations, promotes an in-depth understanding of the complexities of urban terrain, and analyzes urban geography by describing the common characteristics of urban areas. This publication is designed for use at the tactical level and incorporates the latest lessons learned, information from real world and training operations, and TTP from various sources applicable to the urban environment. Current Status: The first draft was released during February 1999; a second Joint Working Group is scheduled for 4-7 May 1999. Contact LTC Zoellers at DSN 575-0962 or e-mail: william.zoellers @langley.af.mil, or Maj Woodson at DSN 575-0961 or e-mail: penny.woodson@langley.af.mil.

"BMO-*MTTP for Bomber-Maritime Operations*" (SECRET) will discuss integration of USAF bombers (Continued on next page) (B-52, B-1, B-2) with naval maritime forces. It delineates bomber capabilities/limitations, "arms" bomber strike mission participants with a comprehensive knowledge of naval maritime procedures, discusses planning procedures, and highlights key tactical considerations for weapon system integration. The MTTP will better educate our joint forces, contribute to more efficient utilization of bomber assets, and enhance joint strike operations. **Current Status**: BMO is approved and at the editor in preparation for printing and release. Contact CDR Woodard at DSN 575-0967 or e-mail: *jim.woodard@ langley.af.mil*, or Maj McManus at DSN 575-0968 or e-mail: *ronald.mcmanus@langley.af.mil*.

"EOD-J – Multiservice Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment" will provide procedures to assist EOD units in planning, coordinating, and integrating explosive ordnance disposal operations in a joint environment. Current Status: The first Joint Working Group is scheduled for 20–23 April 1999, pending approval of the JEOD program statement. Contact Maj Vehr at DSN 575-0966 or e-mail: mary.vehr@langley. af.mil, or MAJ Starkey at DSN 575-0965 or e-mail: richard.starkey@langley.af.mil.

"ICAC-2 – MTTP for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control" will facilitate coordination, integration, and regulation of combat airspace during exercises, contingencies, and other operations where more than one Service must share the airspace for operational use. It will outline the importance of an integrated airspace control function on the battlefield and describe the organization responsible for airspace control in joint operations. It will define procedures for planning, implementing, executing, and deconflicting airspace, including addressing specific airspace control issues for specialized missions. It also will outline the information, interfaces, and communications supporting the integrated airspace control function. Current Status: The signature draft was released during March 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Contact Maj Vehr at DSN 575-0966 or e-mail: mary.vehr@langley.af.mil, or MAJ Starkey at DSN 575-0965) or e-mail: richard.starkey@langley. af.mil.

"JAOC/AAMDC -*MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)/Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination*" will document methods used to coordinate AAMDC operations for the Army forces (ARFOR) with JAOC operations for the joint force air component commander (JFACC)/area air defense commander (AADC)/airspace control authority (ACA). It defines command relationships between AAMDC and the JFACC and it will include the role of the battlefield coordination detachment as the principal liaison element between the ARFOR and the JFACC. It will address

JAOC/AAMDC coordination and integration procedures in five areas: intelligence preparation of the battlespace; passive and active defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. It will specifically address integration between the AAMDC and an Air Force-established JAOC; some of the principles, relationships, and processes described may apply in other circumstances, such as when the USN or USMC is JFACC/AADC/ACA. This publication will provide readers with a common frame of reference for establishing effective working relationships. Current Status: Final coordination draft released for worldwide review; comments due 5 April 99. Contact LTC Morris at DSN 575-0964 or e-mail: brett.morris@ langley.af.mil, or Maj Feaga at DSN 575-0963 ore-mail: keith.feaga@langley.af.mil.

"JIADS – MTTP for Joint Integrated Air Defense Systems" will provide a single, consolidated reference addressing existing Service air defense systems, their capabilities, connectivity and processes as well as describing concepts for the relationships and use of information within Service data and planning networks. It will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations participating in theater air and missile defense. **Current Status:** The first draft was released during March 1999; a second Joint Working Group is scheduled for 13-16 April 1999. Contact Maj. McDonald at DSN 575-0903 or e-mail: *louis.mcdonald@langley. af.mil*, or MAJ Deneff at DSN 575-0854 or e-mail: *wayne.deneff@langley.af.mil*.

"JP 3-55.1, "JTTP For Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." This project originated during the 16-17 April 1996 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), which identified the requirement to revise JP 3-55.1 prior to reformatting. JP 3-55.1 will provide overarching doctrinal guidance and JTTP relating to joint UAV employment as well as providing principles for the planning and execution of such operations. **Current Status:** The second draft was released in December 1998; comments were due on 17 March 1999. The preliminary coordination version will be turned over to the lead agent in May 1999. Contact LTC L. C. Fowler at DSN 575-0853 or e-mail: *lawrence.fowler@langley.af.mil*, or Lt Col J. E. Callaway at DSN 575-0851 or e-mail: *james.callaway@langley. af.mil*.

"JTMTD – MTTP for Joint Theater Missile Target Development" will document MTTP for joint theater missile (TM) target development in early entry and mature theater operations. It will focus on providing a common understanding of the TM target system and information on the component elements involved in attack operations target development. It will focus on integration of the IPB methodology as it applies to TMs, collection management, and target development to include sensor employment considerations to support those operations. It is intended to help joint task force (JTF) and subordinate component commanders and their staffs develop a cohesive approach to the processes necessary to conduct offensive operations against TM forces. **Current Status**: JTMTD is approved and at the editor in preparation for printing and release. Contact LTC Morris at DSN 575-0964 or e-mail: *brett.morris@langley.af.mil*, or Maj Feaga at DSN 575-0963 or e-mail: *keith.feaga@langley.af.mil*.

"NBC Defense of Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields – *Multiservice Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense of Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields.*" In August 1996 the US Army Chemical School, serving as lead agent at the direction of the Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) for NBC Defense, initiated the development of this publication. Service review of the coordinating draft confirmed it did not meet the needs of all Services. Consequently, the JSIG asked ALSA to complete development. **Current Status:** The first Joint Working Group was held from 30 March to 2 April 1999. Contact CDR Woodard at DSN 575-0967 or e-mail: *jim.woodard* @*langley.af.mil*, or Maj McManus at DSN 575-0968 or e-mail: *ronald.mcmanus@langley.af.mil*.

"SEAD – MTTP for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses" will provide the JTF and subordinate component commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators with a single, consolidated reference that discusses the employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and electronic and destructive attack weapons systems to destroy/disrupt/degrade the enemy's air defenses. It will document MTTP for SEADrelated ISR systems, electronic and destructive attack aircraft, fires, and other assets at the SECRET level. Current Status: The signature draft was released in February 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Contact Maj. McDonald at DSN 575-0903 or e-mail: louis.mcdonald@langley.af.mil, or MAJ Deneff at DSN 575-0854 or e-mail: wayne.deneff@langley.af.mil.

"Survival, Evasion, and Recovery – MTTP for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery" will be a consolidated quick reference guide for basic survival, evasion, and recovery information. This publication will be printed on light brown, weatherproof stock and be pocket-sized for portability. The guide will include basic survival information on sustenance, personal protection, emergency medical, personal hygiene, movement techniques, navigation, evading the enemy, signaling, recovery operations, and induced conditions (nuclear, biological, and chemical). Current Status: The signature draft was released in January 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Contact LTC Zoellers at DSN 575-0962 or e-mail: william.zoellers@langley.af.mil, or Maj Woodson at DSN 575-0961 or e-mail: *penny.woodson@langley. af.mil.* 

"TADIL-J– Introduction to TADIL-J and Quick Reference Guide" provides the warfighter and JTF planners and staff with unclassified guidance for TADIL-J planning and operations. This publication can be used to gain an understanding of TADIL J operations and its role in the multi-TADIL world. It also will serve as a central locator for TADIL J references, manuals, and points of contact to increase the warfighter's knowledge, which in turn maximize combat effectiveness. **Current Status:** The signature draft was released in February 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Contact LTC Bilyeu at DSN 575-0905 or e-mail: *elisabeth.bilyeu@langley. af.mil*, or Maj Chewning at DSN 575-0906 or e-mail: *sheila.chewning @langley.af.mil*.

As you can see, our plate remains quite full. We continue to receive excellent support from the Services and warfighting commands, who provide the information and subject matter experts we need to produce quality MTTPs. However, summer is right around the corner, and we sometimes have greater difficulty getting the right experts to attend our working groups during this hectic season. We may need to borrow one or two of your indispensable folks for a few days—we promise to use them wisely and get them back home as soon as possible. Thanks for the continuing support.



#### **ADDRESS UPDATES**

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The US Postal Service has revised the rules and regulations regarding address labels. If you have not received your own personal copy of <u>A Common Perspective</u>, it may be because the address we have in our database is not in the correct format. Please check with your mailroom and provide us with the correct data so we can ensure proper delivery to you. The easiest way is to FAX us your old label page with pen and ink corrections indicated on the label. (We need the two numbers above the address line—one is the number of copies you get; the other is the database ID#.)

Thanks for your help.

FAX changes to: DSN 680-6552 COMM (757)726-6552

### JP 3-60, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING" UPDATE

#### By Major Martin W. DeVorss, USAF, HQ Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) Det 1, Joint Integration Directorate

"It is not the object of war to annihilate those who have given provocation for it, but to cause them to mend their ways."

#### Polybius, Histories (second century B.C.)

The AFDC's Joint Integration Directorate at Langley AFB, VA has produced a second draft (SD) of JP 3-60 for worldwide review. The key issues, concepts, and constructs included in JP 3-60 (SD) are discussed below.

#### JOINT TARGETING

Warfare will continue to be an act of force to compel an adversary to do our will. The purpose of targeting is to determine what will affect, change, modify or impede an adversary's activity or behavior. Joint targeting activities must adhere to specific objectives derived from the joint force commander's (JFC) objectives, guidance, and intent defined during the planning and execution phases of a campaign. Targeting is applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare and across the range of military operations.

#### JOINT TARGETING TERMINOLOGY

Approved joint terminology on joint targeting does not adequately describe the joint targeting process across the range of military operations (e.g., during MOOTW). The approved definitions for "target," "targeting," and "no-strike targets" are perceived as kinetic-centric and not easily adaptable to all desired lethal and non-lethal effects. Additionally, ambiguity exists in defining the difference between a "no-strike target" and a "restricted target" and their associated target lists. Pertinent revisions to approved terms are proposed in JP 3-60 (SD) and shown below:

• **Target**—An area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function or behavior that is identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.


- **Targeting**—The process to detect, select, and prioritize targets, match the appropriate action, and assess the resulting effects based on the commander's objective, guidance, and intent.
- No-Strike Target—A target designated by the appropriate commander upon which attacks are prohibited to avoid interference with military operations, damage to relations with indigenous personnel or governments, or violation of international law, conventions, or agreements.
- **Restricted Target**—A target against which specific restrictions are imposed and against which actions that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters.
- **No-Strike Target List**—A list of no-strike targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander. This list also includes no-strike targets directed by higher authorities.
- **Restricted Target List**—A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander. This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher authorities.

#### JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

The six-phase joint targeting process shown as a figure in JPs 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," and 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting" (final coordination version) does not adequately illustrate the targeting process dynamics between joint and component command levels. Those publications label the six phases as: (1) Objectives and Guidance, (2) Target Development, (3) Weaponeering, (4) Force Application, (5) Execution Planning/Force Execution, and (6) Combat Assessment. Additionally, the phase descriptions contained in JPs 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 3-09, and 3-56.1 are inconsistent with the figure illustrations regarding command relationships and the logical flow of targeting tasks at the joint force versus Service or functional component levels. Of particular concern is the unintended elevation of component commander responsibilities to the JFC regarding target feasibility assessment and validation, mission planning, and execution. The current graphic and text descriptions for the six-phase joint targeting process are perceived as air- and kinetic-centric and not easily adaptable to non-lethal effects, thereby making the phases difficult to apply across the full range of military operations. Further, the joint targeting process is often misinterpreted by surface commanders as the JFACC's targeting process. JP 3-60 (SD) includes a modified illustration of the joint targeting process, shown in Figure 1, that retains the core cyclical nature of the joint targeting process, addresses the above mentioned concerns, and dispels the ambiguity in approved joint doctrine. The descriptions that go with the proposed figure are provided as follows:

- Phase I—Commander's Objectives, Guidance and Intent (formerly Objectives & Guidance), describes how the commander visualizes the campaign, major operation, or phase of an operation unfolding based on the selected course of action (COA). The commander provides targeting planning and execution guidance on the types of targets, priorities, restrictions and desired effects, both lethal and non-lethal. The commander's objectives, guidance and intent are the most important step in the joint targeting process which drives desired effects.
- Phase II—Target Development, Nomination, **Prioritization** (formerly and Target Development), includes analysis of target systems, their components, and elements in order to determine their significance and relevance based on the commander's objectives, guidance and intent. Targeting strategies are developed in order to determine the best way to achieve the stated objectives. The systemic and physical vulnerability of each target based on the lethal and non-lethal capabilities available is examined. The targets are then nominated through the proper channels for approval. Targets are prioritized based on the commander's prioritized objectives and guidance. Critical to the success of the entire targeting process is the establishment of intelligence requirements during this phase. The goal of target development is to optimize the use of effects.

- Phase III—Capabilities Analysis and Tasking (formerly Weaponeering), uses predictive analysis to estimate the most likely effect a capability will achieve against a specific target. Once the predictive analysis is accomplished, the commander will make the appropriate tasking to attack the target. *This phase should take into account target vulnerabilities, capability effects and reliability, precision engagement requirements, and tactics, as well as damage criteria.*
- Phase IV—Mission Planning. (formerly Force Application), prepares detailed input for and supports the actual tasking and construction of missions by forces and weapon systems. This preparation includes detailed mission orders, target acquisition, target validation, identification of overall mission support requirements, and rehearsals as needed. *This phase determines how to apply available forces in order to produce the desired effect(s), and thereby, achieve the desired objective.*
- Phase V—Execution (formerly Execution Planning/Force Execution), occurs when joint forces prepare for, execute, and monitor actual taskings. In this phase, effective coordination, deconfliction and synchronization maximizes effects against targets.
- Phase VI—Effects Assessment (formerly Combat Assessment), is used to determine the overall effectiveness of force or weapon system employment and to recommend future COAs. Effects assessment is conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels during war and MOOTW. Effects assessment is the assessment of



**Figure 1. Targeting Process Phases** 

(Continued on next page)

all execution effects, and includes steps commonly associated with combat assessment. Combat Assessment is composed of three interrelated components: (1) battle damage assessment, (2) munitions effectiveness assessment, and (3) future COA or reattack recommendations. *This phase is the commander's primary feedback mechanism within the joint targeting process.* 

#### JOINT TARGETING EFFECTS

Also included in the glossary and text of JP 3-60 (SD) are definitions relating to targeting effects. Here a doctrinal void exits—there is no clearly defined construct for applying effects-based targeting within joint operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Proposed changes/additions to the relevant terms are as follows:

- **Effects**—The result of military action against a target by lethal or non-lethal means.
- **Direct effects**—Result(s) of military actions with no intervening effect or mechanism between act and outcome. Direct effects are usually immediate and easily recognizable.
- **Indirect effects**—Result created through an intermediate effect or mechanism to produce the final outcome, which may be physical or psychological in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed, and may be difficult to recognize.
- **Effectiveness**—The measurement of the results of military action against a target by lethal or non-lethal means.

- **Strategic Effects Assessment**—The measurement of effects at the strategic level. Strategic assessment determines whether overall strategy is working, and how well the strategic objectives of both sides are being achieved.
- **Operational Effects Assessment**—The measurement of effects at the operational level. Operational assessment determines whether or not force employment is properly supporting overall strategy by meeting operational objectives.
- Combat Assessment or Tactical Effects Assessment—The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) future course of action or reattack recommendation. Also called CA.

#### JOINT TARGETING CATEGORIZATION

Currently, there is no clearly defined construct for categorizing targets within joint operations, particularly with respect to immediate and time-sensitive targets at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. To address this, JP 3-60 (SD) includes a discussion on standard target categories, depicted in Figure 2, as they relate to the joint targeting process.

**Types of Targets**. Targets include the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an adversary commander can use to conduct operations at any level—strategic, operational, or tactical.




Figure 2. Targeting Categories

Targets fall into two general categories, planned, and immediate.

Planned targets are targets that are known to exist in an operational area and against which *effects* have been scheduled in advance or on-call. Examples range from targets on joint target lists in applicable campaign plans, to targets detected in sufficient time to list in the air tasking order, mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Planned targets have two subcategories, scheduled or on-call.

- Scheduled targets are those which are known to exist in an operational area and located in sufficient time for deliberate planning to meet campaignspecific objectives.
- **On-call targets** are those which are known to exist in an operational area and located in sufficient time for deliberate planning that meet emerging situation specific campaign objectives.

**Immediate targets** are targets upon which *effects* have not been scheduled and are normally detected too late to be included in the normal targeting cycle. Immediate targets have three subcategories; unplanned, unanticipated, and *time-sensitive*.

- **Unplanned immediate targets** are those which are known to exist in an operational area but are not detected or located in sufficient time to meet campaign specific objectives.
- Unanticipated immediate targets are those that are unknown or unexpected in an operational area and that, once detected or located, meet emerging situation-specific campaign objectives.
- Time-sensitive targets requiring immediate response before they pose (or soon will pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.

### JOINT TARGETING SUMMARY

Regardless of the threat, a joint force must be able to rapidly execute lethal and non-lethal attacks against targets using the synergistic power of component forces; while considering that components' responsibilities (functional and/or area) may intersect or overlap. The JFC must depend on and leverage the capabilities of the entire joint force to be decisive in battle. Application of these capabilities is enhanced through clear, concise joint targeting procedures allowing the JFC and components to rapidly coordinate information, deconflict operations, and synchronize attacks. Joint targeting should make efficient use of joint force assets and capitalize on their synergistic effects.

# Our next edition will be published in

October 1999. We continue to solicit articles and commentaries regarding joint doctrine/ operations. Submissions should be 1500 words or less-we will consider longer articles as possible features. Please submit articles or letters on disk or via e-mail for ease in handling. We need your submissions by 31 August 1999.

**Newsletter Inputs and** 

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### JOINT PUBLICATION **USER FEEDBACK**

Everyone has the opportunity to make recommendations to improve JPs. Each JP solicits user comments. Comments received by the joint community will be included in the final publication assessment report prepared by the USACOM JWFC. All are strongly encouraged to use this means to help make joint doctrine the best warfighting guidance available. Contact any of our officers through the e-mail, phone, or fax numbers provided on page 20.

### JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE UPDATE

# *By Maj Burt Miller, USAF, USACOM JWFC, Doctrine Division*

JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations," has been under development for over seven years and has progressed no further than a 3rd draft. It suffered almost continuously from various changes to the program directive (PD) requirements. Additionally, over time, most PD requirements were being addressed as other JPs were approved. Consequently, the 14-15 October 1998 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) established the need for a command and control (C2) doctrine working group (WG) to execute, among other tasks, the following:

- 1. Identify what shortfalls exist in joint C2 doctrine.
- 2. Based on the answer to #1, should there be a separate JP on C2 or should C2 issues be folded into existing JPs?
- 3. Provide recommendations to the Joint Staff, J-7 within 90 days.

The C2 WG convened from 9-10 December 1998 at the USACOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Fort Monroe, VA. It was co-chaired by the Joint Staff, J-38/ DSOD and the JP 3-56 lead agent (US Army). The WG developed a long list of C2 subject areas, which it felt should be covered in a JP on C2. However, the WG was not sure about the level of coverage in existing JPs and requested the USACOM JWFC conduct a formal study.

The *Joint C2 Doctrine Study* of 1 February 1999 concluded the following:

- Key C2 subject areas (e.g., command relationships, organization, multinational C2) are common to several JPs. C2 concepts and principles are tailored in focus and depth to serve the individual JP's purpose (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations).
- There are six key JPs that serve as primary references for C2 guidance. For example, JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Services (UNAAF)," is the key resource for basic C2 doctrine (e.g., command relationships) and general guidance for C2 at the strategic and operational levels (e.g., joint force organization). It is the C2 centerpiece for the joint community.

- Most of the C2 subject areas identified by the WG are adequately addressed in JPs. Some are addressed under a different label (e.g., the joint operation planning system as a decisionmaking model). Some are not covered or are very lightly addressed (e.g., information management). Some are addressed in more detail in CJCS directives (e.g., writing orders).
- The development of a separate JP on C2 will require more time and effort than modification of an existing JP(s). One JP will not be comprehensive enough to address all aspects of C2 in every situation. Tailored C2 guidance in other JPs for each type of operation or activity will still be required.
- The essential C2 fundamentals are contained in JP 0-2 and it could be expanded, modified, and strengthened to serve as a more comprehensive foundation for subordinate JPs.

The *Joint C2 Doctrine Study* report recommended the following:

- 1. Reject proposals to develop a separate JP on C2.
- 2. Revise and expand Chapter III, "Command Relationships," in JPO-2 to include new or expanded guidance on basic C2 theory and tenets, the JFC's role, C2 considerations for multiple contingencies in one AOR, decisionmaking and collaborative planning, information management, written and verbal orders, common operational picture, span of control, reachback, the role of (C4) information systems, interagency coordination, civil-military relationships, and multinational force C2 considerations. Change the title to "Fundamentals of Joint Force Command and Control."
- 3. Strengthen and expand Chapter IV, "Doctrine and Policy for Joint Commands," in JP 0-2 to include basic, general guidance and information on joint force organization elements; the theater-level C2 structure; joint force staff organization options, C2 nodes such as boards, centers, cells, elements, liaison organizations, and interagency coordination organizations; and multinational force structures and staff integration. Change the title of Chapter IV to "Fundamentals of Joint Force Organization."

The Joint C2 Doctrine Study report was reviewed by the co-chairs of the C2 doctrine WG. Initial concurrence with the recommendations was indicated and the April 1999 JDWP will make a final decision. The study report can be found at <u>http://www.jwfc.acom.mil/ltdaccess/</u> protected/doctrine/research.htm.



### **TERMINOLOGY**

#### By Mr. Tom Barrows, USACOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

"We shall defend every village, every town, and every city. The vast mass of London itself, fought street by street, could easily devour an entire hostile army; and we would rather see London laid in ruins and ashes than that it should be tamely and abjectly enslaved."

#### Winston Churchill: Broadcast to the British People, 14 July 1940

Homeland defense is not a new concept or idea. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been a threat to the United States for decades. The German V1 and V2 rockets raining upon London and other English cities in World War II were the WMD of that era and were employed against civilian population centers. Winston Churchill regularly rallied his countrymen to remain stalwart in the face of what must have seemed overwhelming despair. The difference between then and now—V1 and V2 rockets were coming from a known enemy in a declared war. We must prepare to defend against WMD from unknown sources and delivered by unconventional means.

From a terminology perspective, several challenges lie immediately ahead. We must define or redefine several key terms, particularly "weapons of mass destruction" and "homeland." We have a DOD-approved definition for "weapons of mass destruction," but it seems to apply only to arms control usage. Within the Department of Defense and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation (Title 14, United States Code), WMD include "nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological" or "NBCR." Other Federal departments and agencies such as the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency define WMD as "NBCR plus conventional weapons." Since US military forces already provide military assistance and support to civil authorities regarding consequence management (CM) (and soon will be more actively engaged in providing such assistance and support), a US Government-approved definition for WMD is an absolute must.

The second term we need to define quickly is "homeland." While we know "homeland" will include places such as Oneonta, NY, Ottumwa, IA, and Odessa, TX, will it include the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or any political subdivision thereof? As we attempt to take approved and emerging policy from DOD directives and CJCS instructions and develop meaningful joint doctrine for homeland defense and for providing military assistance and support to civil authorities in the area of CM, the need for a precise definition of "the homeland" becomes all too evident. To my knowledge, there is no official proposed definition for "homeland."

We must continue to struggle against the "new-wave revisionists" who would have us modify and/or reinvent terminology for no substantive gain. It seems that just when we are about to reach a point where terminology is becoming standardized, along come folks who do not bother to learn the already approved terminology, but rather leap forward and propose new and modified terms and definitions (sort of a term or terms du jour). I'll be the first to lead the charge for needed terminology changes, and the last to sign up for "change for the sake of change." Keep your powder dry out there.



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